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I study how firms diversify through M&As from a learning perspective. I find that firms start with 
small acquisitions to learn about a new line of business and then decide whether to further pursue 
the diversification strategy through subsequent acquisitions. Further, a firm’s propensity to start 
with small acquisitions is positively related to the uncertainty regarding diversification synergy 
and target valuation, and is negatively related to its own industry competition. Additionally, the 
outcome of initial small acquisitions positively affects the probability that the firm makes 
subsequent acquisitions in the new industry. Finally, I find that the subsequent acquisition 
performance of a learning firm is better than the counterfactual performance if it did not choose 
the learning approach. My results suggest that a firm’s decision to learn is optimally determined 
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1. Introduction  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important channel for a firm to diversify and 
reshape its boundaries. Previous research has studied the motivations and consequences of 
corporate diversification. However, little attention has been paid to the implementation of this 
strategy. In this paper, I study how firms diversify through M&As from a learning perspective, i.e., 
firms start with small acquisitions to learn about the new line of business and then decide whether 
to further pursue the diversification strategy through subsequent acquisitions. Using a unique 
dataset containing a firm’s acquisitions history in each industry, I first examine the determinants 
of a firm’s decision to follow the learning approach in its diversification strategy. Contingent on 
choosing the learning approach, I then investigate how the outcome of initial small acquisitions 
affects a firm’s decision regarding subsequent acquisitions. Finally, I explore the effect of learning 
on the performance of subsequent diversifying acquisitions. 
Theory suggests that investment uncertainty positively influences a firm’s propensity to 
choose the learning approach (Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien, 1991). Firms face substantial 
uncertainty when they diversify through M&As. First, it is difficult to estimate diversification 
synergy without operating experience in the new industry because successful diversifying 
acquisitions rely heavily on the compatibility of a firm’s resources such as assets, technologies, 
organizational capabilities, etc. with the new line of business (Matsusaka, 2001; Bernardo and 
Chowdhry, 2002).  Firms can resolve the synergy uncertainty by starting with small acquisitions 
and observing the outcomes. The learning approach limits the downside risk to the investment in 
initial small acquisitions, and it enables firms to better estimate diversification prospects before 
committing to large scale investments. 
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Second, uncertainty also arises from the valuation of takeover targets. Firms face great 
information asymmetry when they choose targets from a new line of business.  Lack of target 
industry specific knowledge impedes a firm’s ability to value target firms properly and thus 
increases the risk of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). By choosing the learning approach, firms 
accumulate industry expertise from initial small acquisitions, which reduces the valuation 
uncertainty for subsequent acquisitions. 
However, the learning approach can be costly in a competitive environment. The learning 
process delays large-scale investments in the new line of business and, as a result, a firm may lose 
its first-mover advantage if rivals have similar access to investment opportunities (Grenadier, 
2002). Further, the free-rider problem also discourages a firm from choosing the learning approach 
because rivals can also observe the outcome of learning and mimic the firm’s diversification 
strategy (Bolton and Harris, 1999). Finally, if rivals have already conducted similar diversification, 
the firm needs to move directly to large acquisitions in order to maintain its competitive position. 
Therefore, high industry competition reduces a firm’s propensity to choose the learning approach. 
In order to examine the dynamic aspects of the learning approach, I build a dataset 
containing a firm’s acquisition history over the period 1994 – 2013 from Thomson Reuter’s SDC 
Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC). Since a firm can conduct acquisitions in 
multiple industries, I identify its first acquisition in each three-digit SIC industry, and then follow 
its subsequent acquisitions in that industry1. A target industry is defined as a diversifying industry 
if it has a different three-digit SIC code from any segment of the acquiring firm. Further, I use 
relative size to measure acquisition size, which is the ratio of transaction value to the acquirer’s 
                                                          
1 Because my sample starts from 1994, it is possible that a firm made acquisitions in the target industry before the first 
acquisition identified in my sample. As SDC starts to report comprehensive M&A data from 1980, I examine the 
firm’s acquisitions back to 1980 in order to ensure that there is no prior acquisition before the first one I identify.  
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market value. However, nearly half of the acquisitions do not have transaction value reported by 
SDC or the acquirer’s 8-K and 10-K filings.2 As firms are required to disclose any important 
corporate decision, I assume acquisitions with no transaction value are small acquisitions3. I also 
classify acquisitions with relative size less than 1% as small acquisitions following existing 
studies.4 My final sample consists of 39,876 acquisitions made by 6,571 firms, of which 22,873 
are small acquisitions and 11,165 are diversifying acquisitions. 
My empirical tests yield the following findings. I find evidence that firms use the learning 
approach when they diversify through M&As. A firm’s first acquisition in a diversifying industry 
is more likely to be small compared to its first acquisition in its own industry. I also find evidence 
that the propensity for a firm to choose the learning approach is positively related to investment 
uncertainty and negatively related to industry competition. Among all diversifying acquisitions, 
firms are more likely to start with small acquisitions when there is less relatedness between their 
own industries and the target industries, when target industries have higher stock return volatility, 
and when target industries have lower asset tangibility. In contrast, firms from industries with 
lower sales Herfindahl index (HHI) are less likely to start with small acquisitions when they 
diversify. These findings indicate that a firm’s decision to use the learning approach is determined 
by the trade-off between the benefits and costs of learning. 
Next, I study how the outcome of initial small acquisitions affects a firm’s decision to 
pursue subsequent acquisitions. By choosing the learning approach, firms can learn about their 
                                                          
2 By utilizing the programming language Python, I search acquirers’ 8-K and 10-K filings for acquisitions with missing 
transaction value from SDC. 
3 My results are robust if acquisitions with missing transaction value are excluded. 
4 The 1% cut-off is commonly used in M&A studies to screen out small acquisitions (see, e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, 2004, 2005; and Masulis, Wang and, Xie, 2007). My results are robust if I classify small acquisition based on 
dollar transaction value and use 1 million dollar as cut-off. 
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diversification prospects from the outcome of small diversifying acquisitions and make investment 
decisions accordingly (Lubatkin, 1983). Therefore, I expect that a firm will continue to make 
subsequent acquisitions in the new industry if the learning outcome is favorable. Otherwise, the 
firm will forgo the diversification strategy to avoid further losses. 
Consistent with my expectation, I find that the outcome of initial small acquisitions 
positively affects the probability for a firm to make subsequent acquisitions. For example, the odds 
of making subsequent acquisitions in the new industry is 1.27 times higher for firms with positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from initial small acquisitions than those with negative 
CARs. I also find that firms tend to make subsequent acquisitions on a larger scale following 
successful small acquisitions. Both the total number and total transaction value of subsequent 
acquisitions are greater for acquiring firms with positive CARs from the initial small acquisitions. 
These findings suggest that the outcome of initial small acquisitions reveals the prospects of the 
diversification strategy, and firms use this information to guide their subsequent investments. 
Firms commit large investments to the new business if diversification creates value for 
shareholders. In contrast, they abandon the diversification projects if they are value-destroying. 
Finally, I study the effect of learning on the performance of subsequent large acquisitions. 
The learning approach implies that a learning firm will conduct large acquisitions after it learns 
positive prospect from the initial small acquisitions, whereas a non-learning firm will start directly 
with large acquisitions. As the learning decision is the equilibrium outcome of a firm’s trade-off 
between the benefits and costs of learning, I have no reason to believe that I will observe any 
systematic cross-sectional differences in acquirer CARs between large acquisitions made by 
learning and non-learning firms.  However, the performance of large acquisition made by a 
learning firm should be better than its counterfactual performance if it did not follow the learning 
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approach. In order to control for the self-selection effect, I use a switching regression model to 
estimate the counterfactual performance change of large acquisitions if learning firms did not 
choose the learning approach (Li and Prabhala, 2005). The difference is -11.62% (t-statistic= -
28.66) in terms of CARs, which is a significant impact on shareholder wealth.5 Taken together, 
this finding justifies a firm’s choice of the learning approach because learning indeed improves 
the performance of future diversifying acquisitions. 
My study makes the following contributions. First, it adds to the literature on organizational 
learning in M&As. Previous studies treat learning as a by-product of M&A activities and document 
a puzzling fact that experienced acquirers underperform inexperienced ones (Ahern, 2007; Aktas, 
deBodt, and Roll, 2011; Billett and Qian, 2005; Conn, Cosh, and Hughes, 2006; Croci and 
Petmezas, 2009; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller ,2002;  Ismail, 2006). I show that the motive for 
learning is to resolve investment uncertainty, and firms deliberately make small acquisitions for 
learning purposes. I, however, find evidence to support the notion that firms indeed learn from 
small acquisitions. Firms make subsequent investment decisions according to the outcome of small 
acquisitions, and learning firms are worse off if they did not choose the learning approach.  
Second, my study also contributes to the diversification literature by examining how firms 
diversify. M&As are a fast way for firms to gain access to new business opportunities, and I find 
that firms can use a learning approach when they implement this strategy. Firms start with small 
acquisitions when they acquire in diversifying industries, and they tend to make subsequent 
acquisitions on a larger scale following successful small acquisitions. The result is consistent with 
the theoretical predictions in Matsusaka (2001) and Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002), who 
                                                          
5 The counterfactual performance change of large acquisitions if non-learning firms followed the learning approach 
is-18.82% (t-statistic = -123.38). 
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demonstrate that diversifying firms conduct experimental investments in various industries to learn 
about their diversification prospects before committing large amount of resources. 
Finally, my study adds to a growing body of M&A literature that recognizes the importance 
of small acquisitions. Earlier studies of M&As exclude small acquisitions from their samples under 
the assumption that they are immaterial investments (see, e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz, 2004, 
2005; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007).  However, small acquisitions account for more than half of 
total acquisition activities every year. Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011) show that merger 
waves are far less apparent when including small acquisitions, and the relation between IPO 
activity and M&A activity also becomes weaker. I highlight the important role small acquisitions 
play when firms pursue opportunities in a new line of business through acquisitions. By starting 
with small acquisitions, firms learn about their diversification prospects, which guide them in 
making subsequent investment decisions. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review the related literature 
and develop hypotheses. I describe the data, variable construction, and summary statistics in 
Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. I provide a summary of 
the paper and my conclusions in Section 8. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
Diversification allows a firm to explore new resources and opportunities beyond its 
boundary. However, diversification also exposes a firm to investment uncertainty in the new line 
of business. Thus, the firm’s ability to resolve investment uncertainty strongly influences the 
profitability of diversification. Learning by investing theory argues that firms can resolve their 
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uncertainties by making real investments and observing the outcomes (Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and 
Jullien, 1991). For example, firms can learn about their costs of operation (Jovanovic, 1982), 
demand curve (Dreze, 1972; Grossman. Kihlstrom, and Mirman, 1977), profit function (Zeira, 
1987), and the risk of R&D projects (Berk, Green, and Naik, 2004). As M&As provide firms a fast 
way to invest in new business domains, firms can also resolve their diversification uncertainty by 
learning from acquisitions in the new business. Small acquisitions are better suited for learning 
because large acquisitions can potentially cause severe wealth destruction to shareholders if they 
go wrong (Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz, 2005). By going small, firms can get a better 
understanding of their diversification opportunities, while limiting the downside risk only to the 
investments in small acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms are likely to start with small acquisitions when they acquire in a 
diversifying industry. 
By starting with small acquisitions, firms learn about the prospects of their diversification 
strategy, which provides guidance on their subsequent investment decisions. The role of initial 
small acquisitions is also similar to a real option on a firm’s diversification strategy. Small 
acquisitions postpone the large scale investments in the new business in order to get better 
estimation of investment prospects (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; and Trigeorgis, 1996). In accordance 
with option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973), the initial small acquisitions are more 
valuable when there is greater uncertainty in a new business.  Investment uncertainty may arise 
from multiple sources when firms diversify through M&As. Matsusaka (2001) and Bernardo and 
Chowdhry (2002) argue that firms face substantial uncertainty about the compatibility of their 
resources with the new business, so it is difficult to predict synergy when the new business is 
seemingly unrelated with the firm’s own business. Further, as firms conduct diversification 
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through M&As, they need to select target firms from the new business. Wang, Xie, and Zhang 
(2014) argue that the lack of operating experience in the target industry limits the acquirer’s ability 
to evaluate target firms, and the risk of adverse selection increases with the degree of information 
asymmetry regarding the target industry. Therefore, firms are more likely to start with small 
acquisitions when there is greater uncertainty about the new business because the information 
learned from initial small acquisitions is more valuable. 
Although learning benefits a firm by resolving investment uncertainty, it also delays the 
firm’s investment in the new business, which may cause the firm to lose its competitive advantage. 
In a competitive industry, strategic considerations can drive a firm to invest quickly in valuable 
opportunities and thereby preempt investments by its rivals (Grenadier, 2002). Moreover, learning 
enables a firm to explore new investment opportunities outside its own business domain; however, 
it also provides a chance for rivals to free ride on the firm’s effort. Rivals can observe the firm’s 
action and mimic its investment strategy (Bolton and Harris, 1999). In addition, firms may also 
need to move directly to large acquisitions in the new business to keep up with rivals who have 
already diversified. Taken together, there are benefits as well as costs associated with learning 
from small acquisitions, and a firm will weigh the benefits against costs when it decides whether 
or not to choose the learning approach to enter a new line of business via acquisitions.  
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s propensity to start with small acquisitions is positively related to 
investment uncertainty and negatively related to industry competition. 
The learning perspective on corporate diversification through M&As implies that before 
making the first acquisition in each new line of business, firms decides whether to take the learning 
approach based on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of learning. If the benefits of 
learning exceed the costs, firms will start with small acquisitions in the new business, and then 
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make decisions on subsequent large acquisitions according to the outcome of initial small 
acquisitions. In contrast, firms will directly start with large acquisitions in the new business if the 
costs of learning exceed the benefits. The firm’s decision tree related to its diversification strategy 
is shown in Figure 1. 
As firms learn about diversification prospects from initial small acquisitions, they are likely 
to make subsequent acquisitions in the new business if the outcome of small acquisitions indicates 
that diversification is likely to be a value-increasing investment opportunity. In contrast, if the 
outcome of small acquisitions suggests that diversification destroys shareholder value, firms are 
likely to forgo the diversification strategy to avoid further losses. In addition, firms also tend to 
make subsequent acquisitions on a larger scale following successful small acquisitions in order to 
take advantage of the profitable diversification opportunity. Under the real option framework, 
favorable outcome of initial small acquisitions implies that the option to invest in the new business 
is in the money, so firms should exercise the option by making large acquisitions subsequently. 
However, when the outcome is unfavorable, firm should let the option expire, and abandon the 
diversification strategy. 
Hypothesis 3: The outcome of initial small acquisitions is positively related to a firm’s 
propensity to make subsequent acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 3a: The outcome of initial small acquisitions is positively related to the scale 
of a firm’s subsequent acquisitions. 
If a firm’s decision to choose the learning approach is determined by the trade-off between 
the benefits and costs of learning, every firm will make its optimal decision in equilibrium, and 
there should be no cross-sectional difference in the performance between subsequent large 
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acquisitions made by learning firms and the initial large acquisitions made by non-learning firms 
after controlling other factors. Otherwise, I should observe all firms choose the learning approach 
if the large acquisitions made by learning firms are systematically better than those made by non-
learning firms. In addition, both learning and non-learning firms will be worse off if they deviated 
from their optimal decisions. Thus, if a firm optimally follows the learning approach, then I should 
observe better subsequent acquisition performance relative to what the acquisition performance 
would have been if the same firm does not follow the learning approach. 
Hypothesis 4: The subsequent acquisition performance of a learning firm is better than its 
(counterfactual) performance if it did not choose the learning approach. 
 
3. Data, variable construction, and summary statistics 
3.1 Sample of acquisitions 
 The sample of acquisitions is from Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum Domestic Mergers 
and Acquisitions database (SDC) between January 1, 1994 and December, 31, 2013.6 I require the 
acquisition to meet the following criteria: (1) the transaction is complete, (2) the acquirer owns 
less than 15% of the target’s shares prior to the deal and owns more than 50% afterwards, (3) 
financial statement information of the acquirer is available from COMPUSTAT and stock return 
data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and (4) the acquirer is not in the financial 
(SIC codes 6000 to 6999) or utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) industries,7 and (5) spinoffs, 
                                                          
6 I need to search firms’ 8-K and 10-K filings for deal transaction value if it is not reported in SDC, and the filings 
are available from SEC website starting from 1994 
7 I follow Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) to exclude financial and utility firms. 
12 
 
recapitalizations, repurchases, self-tenders, leveraged buyouts, privatizations, carve-outs, and 
divestures are excluded. My final sample consists of 39,876 acquisitions made by 6,571 firms.  
3.2 Acquisition history and diversification 
To examine the dynamic feature implied by the learning approach to diversification, I build 
a firm’s acquisition history in each industry based on the target’s primary three-digit SIC code. 
The target industry is defined as a diversifying industry if it has a different three-digit SIC code 
from any segment of the acquiring firm. As a firm may diversify into multiple industries, I treat 
them as separate diversification strategies. The beginning of a firm’s diversification strategy is the 
first acquisition in each diversifying industry. Because my sample starts from 1994, it is possible 
that a firm made acquisitions in the target industry before the first one identified in my sample. 
Therefore, I examine the firm’s acquisitions reported by SDC back until 1980 in order to ensure 
there is no prior acquisition before the first one I identified in the target industry.8 
3.3 Acquisition size, small versus large acquisition 
I use relative size to measure acquisition size, which is the ratio of transaction value to the 
acquirer’s market value 15 days before the announcement date9. However, nearly half of the 
acquisitions do not have the transaction value reported by SDC. By utilizing the programming 
language Python, I search the acquirer’s 8-K and 10-K filings for these missing transaction values. 
As firms are required to disclose any important corporate decision, if I cannot find the transaction 
value for an acquisition, I assume it is an immaterial investment, and I classify it as a small 
                                                          
8 SDC starts to report comprehensive M&A data from 1980. 
9 Table 17shows that my results are robust to alternative definition of small acquisition based on dollar value of the 
deal. 
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acquisition.10 In addition, I also classify acquisitions with relative size less than 1% as small 
acquisitions because they are excluded by most M&As studies due to their small size (see, e.g., 
Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz, 2004, 2005; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). In contrast, 
acquisitions with relative size no less than 1% are classified as large acquisitions. There are 22,873 
(57.36%) small acquisitions and 17,003 (42.64%) large acquisitions in my sample. Figure 2 shows 
the time-serial distribution of small and large acquisitions. From this figure, it appears that small 
acquisitions constitute more than half of total acquisition activities every year. 
3.4 Investment uncertainty and industry competition 
As investment uncertainty arises from both diversification prospect and target valuation, I 
first construct proxy variables for prospect uncertainty based on the industry relatedness between 
the firm’s own industry and the diversifying industry. Following the method in Greene, Kini, and 
Shenoy (2015) and Fan and Goyal (2006), I calculate the vertical relatedness coefficients between 
the diversifying industry and each segment of the firm. I create a dummy variable, Unrelated, 
which is equal to one if none of the vertical relatedness coefficients is above 1%, and zero 
otherwise. Fan and Lang (2000) argue that two businesses are complementary if they can procure 
inputs jointly or share markets and distribution. Following their method, I define Complementarity 
as the highest value of the complementarity between the diversifying industry and each segment 
of the acquiring firm to capture the overlap in the input and output markets. I also create a dummy 
variable, Dif_SIC_1, which is equal to one if the diversifying industry has a different one-digit SIC 
from any segment of the firm. The intuition behind these measures is that it is less difficult to 
                                                          
10 In my sample, there are 21,043 acquisitions whose deal values are not reported by SDC. By searching the acquirer’s 
8-K and 10-K fillings, I find transaction values for 1,965 acquisitions. For the rest acquisitions, they are either never 
mentioned, or the transaction values are not reported. 
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predict the synergy of diversification if the firm’s own industry is related to the diversifying 
industry through product market or operating environment. 
Next, I construct proxy variables for target valuation uncertainty based on the diversifying 
industry information asymmetry. T_STK_Vol is the target industry median stock return volatility. 
Stock return volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock return for a 
given year. T_CF_Vol is the target industry median operating cash flow volatility. Operating cash 
flow volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s quarterly EBITDA/ Total Assets 
over the previous three years. T_Tangibility is the target industry median assets tangibility (Net 
PPE/Total Assets). The intuition behind these measures is that it is difficult for a firm that lacks 
the operating experience in the target industry to evaluate and select takeover targets if the target 
industry is volatile and opaque. 
Finally, I measure the acquirer industry competition as A_HHI, which is the sum of squared 
market shares of all firms in acquirer’s primary three-digit industry. Following Schlingemann, 
Stulz, and Walkling (2002), I also calculate Rival_M&A as the total transaction value of 
acquisitions made by the firm’s rivals in the same target industry within two years preceding the 
firm’s first acquisition, scaled by the book value of the assets in the target industry. These two 
measures capture the cost of using the learning approach as acquirers are more likely to lose their 
competitive advantage in a highly competitive environment. 
3.5 Other variables and summary statistics 
I control for a variety of firm characteristics in the multivariate tests. Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of a firm’s 
market value of total assets to book value of total assets.  Free Cash Flow is defined as a firm’s 
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operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, and income taxes, scaled by the book 
value of total assets. Leverage is defined as a firm’s long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
scaled by book value of total assets. Dividend is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm’s 
dividend payout is positive. CAPEX is defined as a firm’s capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
R&D Intensity is defined as a firm’s R&D expense divided by total assets. Firms which have not 
reported R&D expenses are assigned a R&D Intensity value of zero. Top 5 institution is defined as 
the sum of top five largest institutional holdings as a percentage of total institutional holdings 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
I also control for deal characteristics in the multivariate tests. Diversifying is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if target industry has a different three-digit SIC code from any 
segment of the acquiring firm (28% of the sample) and zero otherwise. Small is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if the acquisition’s relative size is less than 1% (including those with no 
transaction value), and is zero otherwise. Relative Size is transaction value divided by acquirer’s 
market value 15 days before the announcement date. The mean (median) of this measure is 0.19 
(0.06). All-Cash is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the transaction is 100% paid with 
cash (27% of the sample), and is zero otherwise. Public is a dummy variable which is equal to one 
for public target (8% of the sample), and is zero otherwise. The percentage of acquisitions with 
public target is much lower compared to other studies (see, e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz, 
2004, 2005; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), which are about 20%. The reason is that I include 
acquisitions with relative size less than 1%, and these acquisitions are heavily populated with 
private targets. Tender is a dummy variable which is equal to one for tender offer (2% of the 
sample), and is zero otherwise. CAR (-1, +1) is defined as the acquirer’s three day (-1, +1) 
cumulative abnormal return in percentage points calculated using market model. The parameters 
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are estimated using return data for period (-210,-11). Run-up is defined as acquirer’s buy-and-hold 
abnormal return over period (-210,-11) with CRSP value-weighted return as the market return. 
Summary statistics for other variables are shown in Table 1. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. All dollar values are in millions and are adjusted by the Consumer 
Price Index to year 2013 dollars. Variables are also described in Appendix.  
 
4. Determinants of learning  
In this section, I examine the determinants of a firm’s choice of learning. I empirically test 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 and present evidence that firms use a learning approach when they diversify 
through M&As. A firm’s optimal decision to use the learning approach is determined by the trade-
off between the benefits and costs of learning. 
4.1 Diversifying versus non-diversifying acquisitions 
As discussed in the hypotheses development section, a firm’s incentive to learn is driven 
by investment uncertainty. Compared to acquisitions in a firm’s own industry, diversifying 
acquisitions represent investments in a new industry in which the firm has no prior operating 
experience. Therefore, the firm is likely to choose the learning approach by starting with small 
acquisitions when it engages in diversifying acquisitions. In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate 
a logit model with the following specification: 
Small=β0+ β1*First + β2*First*Diversifying + β3*Diversifying +β4*Size + β5*Free Cash Flow 
+β6*Tobin’s Q + β7*Leverage + β8*Dividend + β9*CAPEX + β10*R&D Intensity + β11*Top 5 
Institution +Year Dummies +Constant +ε                                                                                     (1)                                                                                                                                                  
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The dependent variable Small is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the acquisition’s 
relative size is less than 1% (including those with no transaction value), and is zero otherwise. 
First is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the acquisition is the acquiring firm’s first 
acquisition in the target industry, and is zero otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable which 
is equal to one if target industry has a different three-digit SIC code from any segment of the 
acquiring firm, and is zero otherwise. I control for the acquiring firm’s Free Cash Flow, Tobin’s 
Q, Leverage and Dividend to proxy for the firm’s financial constraints, which may limit the firm’s 
ability to make large acquisitions (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). I also control the firm’s internal 
investments through CAPEX and R&D Intensity, as they can be substitutes for the firm’s external 
investments through acquisitions. I further include Top 5 Institution, which measures the 
concentration of institutional ownership, to proxy the corporate governance (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003), as strong governance may deter CEO’s empire-building incentive and thus affect acquirer’s 
choice of deal size (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990)11. 
Model 1 of Table 2 presents results of the estimation of Equation (1). First has a coefficient 
of -0.3589 and is significant at 1%. Diversifying has a coefficient of 0.1941 and is significant at 
1%. The interaction term First*Diversifying has a coefficient of 0.1688 and is significant at 5%. 
These results indicate that a firm’s first acquisition in a diversifying industry is more likely to be 
small compared to its first acquisition in its own industry. The difference in odds ratio is 1.18.  
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Firms are likely to start with small acquisitions when they 
acquire in diversifying industries. In contrast, when they acquire in their own industries, I do not 
                                                          
11 I also control for other governance measures such as CEO duality, board size, board independence, GIM-index 
and E-index in the robustness tests, and my results are robust. 
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observe the same trend. These results confirm that firms are likely to use a learning approach when 
they diversify through M&As.  
In addition, the coefficients on Free Cash Flow, Tobin’s Q, and Dividend are all positive 
and significant; whereas the coefficient on Leverage is negative and significant, suggesting the 
acquirer’s choice of small acquisitions is not driven by the financial constraints. The negative and 
significant coefficients on CAPEX and R&D Intensity indicate that the learning approach can be a 
substitute of internal investment to explore a new industry. 
For robustness, I use a continuous measure of acquisition size in Model 2. The dependent 
variable, Ln (Relative Size) is the natural logarithm of Relative Size, and I estimate an OLS model 
with the same set of independent variables as in Equation (1). Although the sample size is reduced 
by nearly half due to the missing transaction value, the results are largely consistent with those in 
Model 1. It is important to note that coefficients in Model 2 should have opposite signs from those 
in Model 1 because the dependent variable is Ln (Relative Size).  First has a coefficient of 0.1634 
and is significant at 1%. Diversifying has a coefficient of -0.2476 and is significant at 1%. The 
interaction term First*Diversifying has a coefficient of -0.0346, however, it is not statistically 
significant at a conventional level (t-statistic=1.37). 
4.2 Trade-off between benefits and costs of learning 
By starting with small acquisitions, learning benefits a diversifying firm by resolving the 
investment uncertainty; however, it can also weaken a firm’s competitive position as it delays the 
investment. Therefore, the propensity for a firm to choose the learning approach is positively 
related to investment uncertainty and negatively related to industry competition. In equilibrium, 
every firm makes its optimal decision of learning based on the trade-off between the benefits and 
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costs of learning. In order to test this hypothesis, I use a sample that consists of a firm’s first 
acquisition in each diversifying industry, and examine the relation between the acquisition size 
and measures of investment uncertainty and industry competition. I perform both univariate and 
multivariate examinations. 
Table 3 contains univariate analysis of a firm’s decision to start with small acquisitions 
across different measures of the benefits and costs of learning. I define an acquiring firm as a 
learning firm if it starts with small acquisitions in a diversifying industry. In contrast, an acquiring 
firm is defined as a non-learning firm if it moves directly to large acquisitions for its first 
acquisitions. I examine the difference in the mean and median value of Unrelated, 
Complementarity, Dif_SIC_1, T_STK_Vol, T_CF_Vol, T_Tangibility, A_HHI, and Rival_M&A 
between learning firms and non-learning firms. 
For Unrelated, about 58.09% of learning firms are not vertically related with their 
diversifying industries through any of their segments, compared to 55.44% of non-learning firms. 
The difference of 2.65% is significant at the 5% level. Firms with lower Complementarity with 
their diversifying industries are more likely to start with small acquisitions. The difference in mean 
(median) is -0.0162 (-0.0174) and significant at the 5% (5%) level. Learning firms are also less 
likely to have the same one-digit SIC code as their diversifying industries. 60.00% of learning 
firms do not have any segment in the same one-digit SIC industry as their diversifying industries, 
compared to 56.19% of non-learning firms. Firms are more likely to start with small acquisitions 
if the diversifying industries have higher operating cash flow volatility. The difference in mean is 
0.0006 and is significant at the 10% level. I also examine the competitiveness of the firm’s own 
industry measured by A_HHI.  The mean (median) sales Herfindahl Index is 0.0110 (0.0123) 
higher for learning firms and the difference is significant at the 5% (1%) level. The average 
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Rival_M&A is higher for non-learning firms than learning firms by 0.47%, and the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. 
All univariate results are consistent with the earlier predictions. The presence of higher 
investment uncertainty and lower industry competition results in a higher likelihood of a firm to 
start with small acquisitions when they diversify. Next, I examine the effect of investment 
uncertainty and industry competition in a multivariate framework. 
4.3 Multivariate tests  
For the multivariate tests of the determinants of a firm's decision of learning, I use a sample 
of a firm’s first acquisition in each diversifying industry and estimate logit models to predict the 
probability of the acquisition being small. All models use some form of the following specification: 
Small=β0+ β1* Unrelated + β2* Complementarity + β3* Dif_SIC_1+ β4* T_STK_Vol+ β5* 
T_CF_Vol+ β6* T_Tangibility + β7* A_HHI+ β8* Rival_M&A +β9*Size + β10*Free Cash Flow 
+β11*Tobin’s Q + β12*Leverage + β13*Dividend + β14*CAPEX + β15*R&D Intensity + β16*Top 5 
Institution + β17*T_Q + β18*T_ROA + β19*T_Sale Growth +Year Dummies +Constant +ε   (2)                                                                                                                                                                    
The dependent variable Small is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the acquisition’s 
relative size is less than 1% (including those with no transaction value) and zero otherwise. Control 
variables are similar as Equation (1). In addition, I also include T_Q, T_ROA, and T_Sale Growth 
to proxy for the target industry profitability and growth. T_Q is the target industry median Tobin’s 
Q, T_ROA is the target industry median return on assets (EBIT/ Total Assets), and T_ Sale Growth 
is the annual percentage change in target industry sales. 
Table 4 contains multivariate logit estimates. Models 1-3 examine the effect of 
diversification prospect uncertainty on the propensity of learning. In Model 1, Unrelated has a 
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coefficient of 0.0970 and is significant at the 10% level. In Model 2, Complementarity has a 
coefficient of -0.2132 and is significant at 5%. In Model 3, Dif_SIC_1 has a coefficient of 0.1776 
and is significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. A firm’s 
propensity to start with small acquisitions is positively related to investment uncertainty of the 
prospect of diversification. It is difficult for a firm to predict the synergy generated by 
diversification if the new industry is seemingly unrelated to the firm’s own industry through 
product market or operating environment. Therefore, the firm is likely to learn from small 
acquisitions before committing to large investment in the new industry. 
Models 4-6 examine the effect of target valuation uncertainty on the propensity of learning. 
In Model 4, T_STK_Vol has a coefficient of 5.4369 and is significant at the 5% level. In Model 5, 
T_CF_Vol has a coefficient of 6.3911 and is significant at the 1% level. In Model 6, T_Tangibility 
has a coefficient of -0.3443 and is significant at the 5% level. These results are also consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. A firm’s propensity to start with small acquisitions is positively related to investment 
uncertainty of target evaluation. It is difficult to for a firm to properly valuate target firms from a 
new industry which has high information asymmetry. Therefore, the firm is likely to start with 
small acquisitions to learn the industry expertise in the new industry. 
Model 7 and 8 examine the effect of acquirer industry competition on the propensity of 
learning. In Model 7, A_HHI has a coefficient of 0.4300 and is significant at the 10% level. In 
Model 8, Rival_M&A has a coefficient of -0.6881 and is significant at the 10% level. These results 
are also consistent with Hypothesis 2. A firm’s propensity to start with small acquisitions is 
negatively related to industry competition. Firms need to invest quickly to preempt the investment 
from their rivals; thus, they are likely to move directly to large acquisitions in the new industry. 
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Additionally, if rivals have already invested in the new industry, firms also tend to make large 
acquisitions to follow the industry trend and strengthen their competitive positions.  
In Model 9, I present results including proxies for diversification prospect uncertainty, 
target valuation uncertainty, and industry competition. T_CF_Vol and Complementarity are not 
included in the regression because they are highly correlated with T_STK_Vol and Dif_SIC_1, 
respectively. The results are similar to those in Model 1, 3-4, 6-8. Unrelated has a coefficient of 
0.1086 and is significant at the 5% level. Dif_SIC_1 has a coefficient of 0.1865 and is significant 
at the 1% level. T_STK_Vol has a coefficient of 5.5006 and is significant at the 5% level. 
T_Tangibility has a coefficient of -0.2728 and is significant at the 10% level. A_HHI has a 
coefficient of 0.3780 and is significant at the 10% level. Rival_M&A has a coefficient of -0.6287 
and is significant at the 10% level.   
For robustness, I re-run the specification in Equation (2) with the continuous measure of 
acquisition size, Ln (Relative Size), as the dependent variable. The OLS estimates are presented in 
Table 5. The sample size is reduced due to missing transaction values. Overall, the results are 
consistent with Table 4. It is important to note that the signs of coefficients of all variables are 
expected to flip because Ln (Relative Size) measures the acquisition size, whereas Small measures 
the probability of an acquisition being small. Again, results in Table 4 and 5 are in support of 
Hypothesis 2. Firms optimally make their decisions of learning based on the trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of learning. The propensity for a firm to start with small acquisitions is positively 
related to investment uncertainty and negatively related to industry competition. 
 
5. Probability of subsequent acquisitions  
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In this section, I examine how the outcome of initial small acquisitions affects a firm’s 
decision on subsequent acquisitions. I empirically test Hypothesis 3 and 3a and present evidence 
that the outcome of initial small acquisitions positively affects the probability for a firm to make 
subsequent acquisitions. Firms are also likely to make subsequent acquisitions on a larger scale 
following successful small acquisitions. 
5.1 Probability of subsequent acquisitions -logit model 
As discussed in the hypotheses development section, learning firms improve their 
estimation of the diversification synergy by observing the outcomes of small acquisitions. They 
will continue to make subsequent acquisitions if the outcome is favorable. Otherwise, firms will 
forgo the diversification strategy to avoid further losses. In order to test this hypothesis, I use a 
sample of learning firms and examine their subsequent acquisitions within a five-year window12 
following the first acquisition in each diversifying industry. Specifically, I estimate a logit model 
with the following specification: 
Subsequent =β0+ β1* Success + β2*Size + β3*Free Cash Flow +β4*Tobin’s Q + β5*Leverage + 
β6*Dividend + β7*CAPEX + β8*R&D Intensity + β9*Top 5 Institution + β10*T_Q + β11*T_ROA 
+ β12*T_Sale Growth +Year Dummies +Constant +ε                                                                  (3)                                                                                                                                                                    
The dependent variable Subsequent is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a learning 
firm makes any subsequent acquisition in the same industry within a five-year window following 
its first acquisition, and is zero if it makes no subsequent acquisition. Success measures the 
outcome of initial small acquisitions. It is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the CAR (-1, 
                                                          
12 Table 16 shows that my results are robust to using a three-year window following the first acquisitions. 
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+1) of the first acquisition is positive, and is zero otherwise.13 The rationale behind this measure 
is that acquirers learn that a diversification is a value-increasing investment opportunity if it 
generates positive shareholder return, and thus they are likely to further pursue the diversification. 
The results of logit regressions are reported in Table 6.  All estimates in this table are 
presented in terms of odds ratios. In Model 1, the odds ratio associated with Success is 1.2744 and 
is significant at the 5% level. The result indicates that the odds of making subsequent acquisitions 
is 1.2744 times larger for learning firms with positive CARs from their first acquisitions compared 
to those with negative CARs. As illustrated by the firm’s decision tree in Figure 1, the difference 
between a learning firm and a non-learning firm is whether it starts with small acquisitions before 
moving to large ones. Therefore, in Model 2, I examine the probability of large subsequent 
acquisitions. Dependent variable Large_Subsequent is a dummy variable which is equal to one if 
a learning firm makes subsequent acquisitions with relative size no less than 1% in the same 
industry within a five-year window following its first acquisition, and is zero if it makes no 
subsequent acquisition or if it makes acquisitions with relative size smaller than 1%. The odds 
ratio associated with Success is 1.4371 and is significant at the 10% level. The result implies that 
the odds of making large subsequent acquisitions is 1.4371 times larger for learning firms with 
positive CARs from their first acquisitions compared to those with negative CARs. To further 
capture a firm’s commitment to its diversification strategy, I examine the probability for a learning 
firm to have a new segment in its diversifying industry through subsequent acquisitions and /or 
internal investment. In Model 3, the dependent variable New_Segment is a dummy variable which 
is equal to one if a learning firm has a new segment in the diversifying industry within a five-year 
                                                          
13 It is difficult to measure the operating performance of small acquisitions. Instead, I assume that the stock market 
reactions efficiently reflect the profitability of small acquisitions. 
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window following its first acquisition, and is zero if it adds no new segment in the diversifying 
industry. The odds ratio associated with Success is 1.2853 and is significant at the 10% level. The 
result implies that the odds of adding a new segment is 1.2853 times larger for learning firms with 
positive CARs from their first acquisitions compared to those with negative CARs. These results 
are consistent with Hypothesis 3. The outcome of initial small acquisitions is positively related to 
a firm’s propensity to make subsequent acquisitions. Positive announcement period return of the 
first acquisitions suggests the diversification is a value-enhancing investment opportunity, and thus 
firms are likely to expand their investments in the new industries. 
5.2 Probability of subsequent acquisitions -hazard model 
Logit model considers the proportion of subsequent acquisitions for a given time period 
(e.g., a five-year window) and estimates the effect of the outcome of first acquisitions on the odds 
of subsequent acquisitions. Hazard model, in contrast, considers the rate of subsequent acquisition 
and estimates the effect of the outcome of initial small acquisitions on the time to subsequent 
acquisitions. For the sample of learning firms, I measure the hazard of subsequent acquisition, i.e., 
the likelihood that a firm makes a subsequent acquisition in year t+1 given there has been no 
subsequent acquisition for t years since the initial small acquisition. I assume the duration for a 
firm with no subsequent acquisition follows a distribution characterized by a proportional hazard 
function: 
                                         ℎ𝑡
𝑡+1(𝑥𝑖𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛿)                                                  (4)                                                    
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm and target industry characteristics same as the independent 
variables defined in equation (3), and 𝛿 is the coefficients of these characteristics. Following Cox 
(1972), the baseline hazard function is unspecified.  
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The results of hazard regression are reported in Table 7.  All estimates in this table are 
presented in terms of hazard ratios. In Model 1, the event that triggers the termination of the 
duration is a subsequent acquisition of any size. The hazard ratio associated with Success is 1.2750 
and is significant at the 1% level. The result suggests that learning firms with positive CARs from 
their first acquisitions make subsequent acquisitions faster than those with negative CARs. At any 
given time, a learning firm with positive CAR but has not made a subsequent acquisitions is 1.2750 
times more likely to make one during next year compared to a learning firm with negative CAR. 
In Model 2, I model the hazard for large subsequent acquisition.  The hazard ratio associated with 
Success is 1.4086 and is significant at the 10% level. The result suggests that learning firms with 
positive CARs from their first acquisitions also make large subsequent acquisitions faster than 
those with negative CARs. In Model 3, the event is having a new segment in the diversifying 
industry. The hazard ratio associated with Success is 1.1958 and is not significant at conventional 
level (t-statistic=1.45). Taken together, these results are also consistent with Hypothesis 3. The 
outcome of initial small acquisitions positively affects a firm’s probability to make subsequent 
acquisitions. Firms expand quickly in the new industries when they learn favorable information 
from initial small acquisitions. 
5.3 Scale of subsequent acquisitions 
I examine how the outcome of initial small acquisitions affects the scale of subsequent 
acquisitions in Table 8. I run OLS regressions with the same specification in Equation (3), where 
the dependent variables are measures of a firm’s total subsequent acquisitions within a five-year 
window following its first acquisition. In Model 1, the dependent variable is Ln (Tot_Num), which 
is the natural logarithm of the total number of subsequent acquisitions in each diversifying industry. 
The coefficient of Success is 0.0288 and is significant at the 1% level. In Model 2, the dependent 
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variable is Ln (Tot_RV), which is the natural logarithm of the sum of the relative size of subsequent 
acquisitions in each diversifying industry. The coefficient of Success is 0.0037 and is significant 
at the 5% level. In Model 3, the dependent variable is Ln (Tot_DV), which is the natural logarithm 
of the sum of the dollar value of subsequent acquisitions in each diversifying industry. The 
coefficient of Success is 0.0841 and is significant at the 5% level. Results in Table 8 suggest that 
firms are likely to make subsequent acquisitions on a larger scale following successful small 
acquisitions, which is also consistent with Hypothesis 3a. The outcome of initial small acquisitions 
is positively related to the scale of a firm’s subsequent acquisitions. 
 
6. Learning and performance of large acquisitions  
In this section, I examine how learning affects the performance of diversifying acquisitions. 
As discussed in the hypotheses development section, a firm’s decision to learn is determined by 
the trade-off between the benefits and costs of learning. Because these benefits and costs differ 
across firms, in equilibrium, there are variations in their choice of learning. I, therefore, should 
expect no difference in performance between subsequent large acquisitions made by learning firms 
and the first large acquisitions made by non-learning firms. I test this conjecture by estimating an 
OLS model with the following specification: 
CAR (-1, +1) =β0+ β1*Learning + β2*Size + β3*Tobin’s Q + β4*Free Cash Flow + β5*Leverage 
+ β6*Run-up + β7*Relative Size + β8*All-Cash + β9*Public + β10*Tender +Year Dummies 
+Constant +ε                                                                                                                                (5)                                                                           
I use CAR (-1, +1) as the dependent variable to measure the acquisition performance, which 
is the acquiring firm’s three day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return in the large acquisition. 
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Learning is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the acquiring firm is a learning firm, and is 
zero otherwise. The sample consists the first subsequent large acquisitions made by a learning firm 
and the first large acquisitions made by a non-learning firm. The results are reported in Model 1 
of Table 9. The coefficient of Learning is -0.7020 and is not statistical significant at conventional 
level (t-statistic=-1.07). This result is in support of the optimal learning decision argument. It 
appears that a firm’s decision to learn is optimally determined in equilibrium as there is no cross-
sectional difference in performance between large acquisitions made by a learning firm and a non-
learning firm. 
However, the performance of large acquisition made by a learning firm should be better 
than its counterfactual performance if it did not follow the learning approach. The change in 
acquisitions performance when firms deviate from the optimal learning decisions captures the 
effect of learning. I use a switching regression model which allows me to control for this 
endogenous decision and estimate the counterfactual performance changes for large acquisitions 
if learning firms did not use the learning approach (Li and Prabhala, 2005)14. The methodology of 
switching regression model is similar to estimate two Heckman selection models simultaneously.  
In the first stage, the decisions of learning and non-learning are estimated separately according to 
the specification in Model 9 of Table 4. In the second stage, Equation (5) is estimated for learning 
and non-learning firms with their inverse Mills ratios included. Model 2 and 3 of Table 9 reports 
the coefficients for both learning and non-learning firms. The counterfactual CAR (-1, +1) for 
subsequent large acquisition made by a learning firms if it did not learn is calculated using the 
learning firm’s characteristics and coefficients for non-learning firms from Model 3. The 
difference between actual CAR (-1, +1) and counterfactual CAR (-1, +1) is 11.62% (t-
                                                          
14 I use the Stata Syntax movestay to conduct the switching regression. 
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statistic=28.66). Calculated in the same way, the difference between actual CAR (-1, +1) and 
counterfactual CAR (-1, +1) for first large acquisitions made by non-learning firms is 18.82% (t-
statistic=123.38). The results in Table 9 are consistent with Hypothesis 4. Learning firms achieve 
higher acquisition performance compared to the counterfactual performance if they did not learn. 
The learning benefit is, on average, 11.62% higher in announcement period abnormal returns. 
Further, both learning and non-learning firms are worse off if they deviate from their decisions. 
The results again support the optimal learning decision argument.  
 
7. Robustness tests 
This section discusses the empirical results from several additional robustness tests that I 
conducted. First, I examine the influence of various corporate governance measures on my main 
results. These robustness tests address the concern that acquirer’s choice of small acquisitions is 
not because of the learning purpose, but is driven by the disciplinary power of corporate 
governance that discourages CEO from engaging in empire-building acquisitions (Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990). I replicate Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 by including 
various corporate governance measures and present the coefficients on the main variables of 
interest in Table 10. Panel A shows the coefficients on First, Diversifying and the interaction term 
First*Diversifying from replications of Model 1 of Table 2. In Model 1-3, I control for a set of 
board characteristics (CEO Duality, Board Size, and Board Independence) and measures that 
capture anti-takeover measures (either GIM index or E-index). The coefficients on GIM index 
(Gomper, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) and E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009) are both 
negative and significant, thereby suggesting that strong discipline power from the corporate control 
market discourages acquirers from making large acquisitions. However, the coefficients on First, 
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Diversifying, and the interaction term First*Diversifying are still very similar to the original results 
in Model 1 of Table 2. Thus, my empirical results on acquirer’s learning incentives in diversifying 
acquisitions do not appear to be fully driven by corporate governance. Panel B of Table 10 shows 
the coefficients on T_STK_Vol, T_Tangibility, Unrelated, Dif_SIC_1, A_HHI, and Rival_M&A 
from replications of Model 9 of Table 4. The signs of these coefficients are same as my main 
results; however, some of these coefficients lose statistical significance when corporate 
governance measures are included. One possible reason for these weak results is the reduced 
number of observations due to the unavailability of governance measures. In addition, among 
various governance measures, only E-index is significantly and negatively related to acquirer’s 
propensity of starting with small acquisitions. This negative relation implies that acquirers that are 
subjected to stronger discipline from corporate control market are more likely to choose small 
acquisitions. Overall, the results in Panel B of Table 10 suggest that my empirical results on the 
determinants of learning are largely unaffected by controlling for corporate governance.  
Second, I examine whether target industry characteristics explain the acquirer’s choice of 
small acquisitions. I investigate both the time-variant and time-invariant target industry 
characteristics by replicating Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 with target industry-year 
fixed effects and target industry fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients on the main variable 
of interest are reported in Table 11. Panel A shows the coefficients on First, Diversifying, and the 
interaction term First*Diversifying from replications of Model 1 of Table 2. Panel B shows the 
coefficients on Unrelated, Dif_SIC_1, T_STK_Vol, T_Tangibility, A_HHI and Rival_M&A from 
replications of Model 9 of Table 4. These results with target industry-year fixed effects and target 
industry fixed effects are qualitatively similar to the main results, and thus my empirical results on 
acquirer’s choice of learning approach are robust to controlling for target industry characteristics. 
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In addition, I also alleviate the concern that acquirer’s choice of small acquisitions is driven by 
whether the target industry is a high technology industry or not. I divide my sample into two 
subsamples based on whether the target industry is a high technology industry or not using the 
definition in Loughran and Ritter (2004). I then replicate Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 
4 in each subsample, and present the coefficients on the main variables of interest in Models 3 and 
4 of Table 11. The results are largely similar to the original results; however, for the replication of 
Model 9 of Table 4 in the subsample of low technology industry, the coefficients on Unrelated, 
T_Tangibility, A_HHI and Rival_M&A are not statistically significant. One possible reason for 
these weaker results is the reduced number of observations. Overall, my empirical results do not 
appear to be driven by whether the target industry is a high technology industry or not. 
Third, I examine whether or not my results are robust to excluding private and subsidiary 
targets. Private and subsidiary targets represent 92% of total acquisitions when small acquisitions 
are also included in the sample. It is possible that acquirers choose small acquisitions not because 
of their size but because of the target’s public status. To address this concern, I replicate Model 1 
of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 with a subsample of public targets only. The coefficients on the 
main variables of interest are reported in Table 12. In Model 1 of Panel A, the coefficient on the 
interaction term First*Diversifying is positive and significant, suggesting that acquirer’s learning 
incentive in diversifying acquisitions do not appear to be driven by the private and subsidiary 
targets. In Model 1 of Panel B, the results are much weaker than the original ones. Although the 
signs of coefficients on the main variables of interest are consistent with original results, only the 
coefficients on Dif_SIC_1 and A_HHI are statistically significant. In addition, I also conduct 
robustness tests to address the concern that extremely small or large acquirer size will affect the 
distribution of small acquisitions because I define small acquisition based on the relative size of 
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the deal. In Model 2 of Table 12, I remove the effect of extremely large and small acquirers and 
replicate Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 by excluding deals whose acquirer size is in 
the top and bottom quartiles. The coefficients on the main variables of interest are largely 
consistent with the original results and, thus, my results are robust to excluding extremely large 
and small acquirers. 
Fourth, I examine the robustness of the switching regression results by using different 
variables in the first-stage selection model. In the original results, I use the same set of variables 
to proxy for the benefits and costs of learning as in Model 9 of Table 4, which has Unrelated, 
Dif_SIC_1, T_STK_Vol, T_Tangibility, A_HHI and Rival_M&A. In the robustness tests, I use 
Unrelated, Complementarity, Dif_SIC_1, T_STK_Vol, T_CF_Vol, T_Tangibility, A_HHI and 
Rival_M&A, respectively in each selection model and then conduct the switching regression as in 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 9. Table 13 reports the differences in actual CARs and counterfactual 
CARs for both learning and non-learning firms from each switching regression. The results are 
very similar to the original results in Table 9, thereby suggesting that my empirical results are 
robust to using different variables in the selection model of the switching regression. 
Fifth, I examine the robustness of my results to an alternative event window to compute 
acquirer CARs. I replicate Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 by constructing acquirer CARs based on 
announcement returns measured over the (-2, +2) day window around the deal announcement. The 
coefficients on the main variables of interest are reported in Table 14. Panels A, B, and C show 
the coefficients on Success from replications of Tables 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Panel D shows 
the replication of Table 9. The results in Table 14 are largely similar to the main results. All the 
coefficients on Success are positive, however, they are not as significant as the original ones. The 
results suggest that a narrower event window may be better at capturing the market reaction to 
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acquirer’s small acquisitions. In Panel D of Table 14, there is still no significant difference between 
learning and non-learning firms in terms of the acquirer five-day CAR (-2, +2) from their large 
acquisitions. The switching regression estimates that the differences between actual and 
counterfactual CAR (-2, +2) for learning and non-learning firms are 13.82% and 5.30%, 
respectively and both are significant at the 1% level. 
Sixth, I examine how learning affects the post-merger operating performance of 
diversifying acquisitions. I replicate Table 9 using change in post-merger return on sales (∆ROS) 
as the dependent variable to investigate the difference in post-merger operating performance 
between subsequent large acquisitions made by learning firms and the first large acquisitions made 
by non-learning firms. Table 15 presents the results.  I construct ∆ROS as the difference between 
acquirer’s post-merge three-year average ROS and ROS before the acquisition. Similar to the 
original results, the coefficient on Learning is not statistically significant. The switching regression 
estimates suggest that the differences between actual and counterfactual ∆ROS for learning and 
non-learning firms are 0.25 and 0.14, respectively, and are both significant at the 1% level. Overall, 
my results are robust to using change in post-merger return on sales as the performance measure 
of large acquisitions. 
Seventh, I use a three-year window instead of a five-year window to investigate the relation 
between the outcome of small acquisitions and the propensity and scale of subsequent acquisitions. 
I replicate Table 6, and 8 using a three-year window after the acquirer’s first acquisition. The 
coefficients on Success are reported in Table 16. Panel A shows the replication of Table 6, and 
Panel B shows the replication of Table 8. All the coefficients on Success are positive and 
significant as in the original results, except that in Model 3 of Panel A and Model 2 of Panel B, 
the coefficients on Success are not significant. Overall, my results are robust to using the three-
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year window, and the insignificant result on the propensity of having a new segment in the 
diversifying industry implies that the three-year window may be not long enough to capture the 
acquirer’s decision of adding a new segment. 
 Eighth, I examine an alternative definition of small acquisition that is based on the dollar 
value of the transaction. I replicate Table 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 by defining Small as a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the acquisition’s transaction value is less than 1 million dollars 
(including those with no transaction value) and zero otherwise. The coefficients on the main 
variables of interest are reported in Table 17. Panel A shows the coefficients on First, Diversifying 
and the interaction term First*Diversifying from replications of Table 2. Panels B and C shows the 
coefficients on Unrelated, Complementarity, Dif_SIC_1, T_STK_Vol, T_CF_Vol, T_Tangibility, 
A_HHI and Rival_M&A from replications of  Table 4 and 5, respectively. Panels D, E, and F show 
the coefficients on Success from replications of Tables 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Panel G shows 
the replication of Table 9. As show in Table 17, the empirical results in Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, 
and G are qualitatively similar to the main results reported in the paper. Thus, my results are robust 
to the alternative definition of a small acquisition. 
Finally, I examine alternative industry classifications. In the original tests, I use three-digit 
SIC industry classification. As a robustness check, I also replicate Tables 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
separately using two-digit and four-digit SIC industry classification schemes. The coefficients on 
the main variables of interest using two-digit SIC industry classification are reported in Table 18. 
Panel A shows the coefficients on First, Diversifying, and the interaction term First*Diversifying 
from replications of Table 2. Panels B and C shows the coefficients on Unrelated, 
Complementarity, Dif_SIC_1, T_STK_Vol, T_CF_Vol, T_Tangibility, A_HHI and Rival_M&A 
from replications of Table 4 and 5, respectively. Panels D, E, and F show the coefficients on 
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Success from replications of Tables 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Panel G shows the replication of 
Table 9. Table 19 summarizes the findings with four-digit SIC industry classification and is 
structured the same as Table 18.  Results in Panels A, B, C and G of Tables 18 and 19 are largely 
similar to the original results, suggesting the findings on firm’s choice of learning do not appear 
to depend on the industry classification. Acquirers are more likely to start with small deals in 
diversifying acquisitions compared to acquisitions in their own industries. Further, they optimally 
decide whether to follow the learning approach based on the trade-off between benefits and costs 
of learning. In contrast, only two out of eighteen coefficients on Success in Panels D, E and F of 
Table 18 and 19 are positive and significant, indicating that the propensity and scale of acquirer’s 
subsequence acquisitions in the diversifying industry are not consistently positively related with 
the outcome of small acquisitions when two-digit SIC or four-digit SIC industry classification is 
used. One possible explanation is that, for a narrower industry classification, there are more 
observations on the first acquisition in each diversifying industry but less observations on the 
subsequent acquisitions, which weakens the results. In contrast, for a broader industry 
classification, the business of subsequent acquisitions may not be very similar to the business of 
the first acquisition and the acquirer’s decision to make subsequent acquisitions may not be a result 
of learning but starting another learning process. Therefore, the positive relation between the 
outcomes of small acquisitions and propensity and scale of acquirer’s subsequent acquisitions also 
becomes weaker. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Using a unique dataset containing a firm’s acquisitions history in each industry, I study 
how firms diversify through M&As from a learning perspective. Theory predicts that real 
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investments help firms resolve the investment uncertainty. Firms can, thus, start with small 
acquisitions to learn about the new line of business before they commit large investments to the 
diversification strategy. Small acquisitions are very suitable for this purpose. By starting with small 
acquisitions, firms better estimate the diversification synergy and obtain industry expertise, and 
they also limit the downside risk to the investments in small acquisitions. However, learning could 
also be costly in a competitive environment. It delays the large-scale investment in the new line of 
business, so a firm may lose its first-mover advantage. Therefore, firms make their decision 
regarding learning based on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of learning. Consistent 
with these arguments, I find that the propensity for a firm to start with small acquisitions is 
positively related to investment uncertainty and negatively related to industry competition. 
For firms who choose to start with small acquisitions, their probability of making 
subsequent acquisitions is positively related to the outcome of small acquisitions. Duration 
analysis based on Cox proportional hazard models also show that firms with positive cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) from initial small acquisitions make subsequent acquisitions faster than 
those with negative CARs. Moreover, as firms make their optimal learning decision in equilibrium, 
I find no cross-sectional difference in CARs between subsequent large acquisitions made by 
learning firms and the first large acquisitions made by non-learning firms in an OLS setting. Finally, 
I use a switching regression approach to compare learning firms to those who should have chosen 
the learning approach but did not. The difference in CARs between large acquisitions made by 
learning firms and counterfactual firms is about 11.62%, which justifies a firm’s choice of the 
learning approach as learning indeed improves the performance of subsequent diversification 
investments. 
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My study makes the following contributions. First, although diversification is among the 
most important corporate decisions, little attention has been paid by existing studies to the process 
of diversification. I examine how firms diversify through M&As from a learning perspective – 
firms start with small acquisitions to learn about the new line of business and then decide whether 
to pursue the diversification through subsequent acquisitions. Second, previous studies treat 
learning as a by-product of M&A activities. In contrast, I show that firms deliberately make small 
acquisitions for learning purposes as these acquisitions help them resolve investment uncertainty. 
Finally, I add to M&As studies by recognizing the important role small acquisitions play as the 
channel for firms to learn about the efficacy of their diversification strategies. 
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Appendix: Data sources and variable definitions 
Variable Source Definition 
A: Deal characteristics 
Relative Size SDC, CRSP Transaction value divided by acquirer’s market value 15 
days before the announcement date 
Small  SDC, 8-K, 10-K Dummy variable that equals one if relative size is less than 
1% or transaction value is missing 
Diversifying SDC Dummy variable that equals one if target industry has a 
different three-digit SIC code from any segment of the 
acquiring firm 
First SDC Dummy variable that equals to one if the acquisition is the 
acquirer’s first acquisition in the target industry 
CAR (-1, +1) CRSP, SDC Three day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return in percentage 
points calculated using market model. The parameters are 
estimated using return data for period (-210,-11)  
Public target SDC Dummy variable that equals one if target status is a public 
firm 
All-cash deal SDC Dummy variable that equals one if transaction is 100% paid 
with cash  
Tender  SDC Dummy variable that equals one if the tender offer flag is 
‘Yes’ 
Run-up CRSP Acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return over period (-210,-
11) with CRSP value-weighted return as the market return. 
B: Acquiring firm characteristics 
Size  Compustat Log of acquirer book value of total assets 
Tobin’s Q Compustat Market value of assets divided by book value of assets; 
(AT+PRCC_F*CSHO-CEQ-TXDB)/AT 
Free Cash Flow Compustat (OIBDP-TXT-XINT)/AT 
Leverage Compustat Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by 
book assets; (DLTT+DLC)/AT 
Dividend Compustat Dummy variable that equals one if the dividend payout is 
positive 
CAPEX Compustat Capital expenditure scaled by total assets; CAPX/AT 
R&D Intensity Compustat R&D expense divided by total book assets; RDX/AT.  If the 
value is missing, assume it is zero. 
Top 5 Institution Thomson Reuters 13F Holdings of top 5 institutions as a percent of total 
institutional holdings 
A_HHI Compustat Sum of squared market shares of all firms in acquirer’s 
primary three-digit industry 
Rival_M&A Compustat, SDC Total transaction value of acquisitions made by the firm’s 
rivals in the same target industry within two years preceding 
the firm’s current acquisition, scaled by the book value of the 
assets in the target industry 
C: Target industry characteristics 
Unrelated BEA Use Table Dummy variable that equals one if none of the vertical 
relatedness coefficients between the target industry and each 
segment of the firm is above 1% 
Complementarity BEA Use Table The lowest value of complementarity between the target 
industry and each segment of the firm 
Continued on next page 
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Appendix (continued)   
Dif_SIC_1 Compustat, SDC Dummy variable that equals one if the target industry has a 
different one-digit SIC from any segment of the firm 
T_STK_Vol CRSP Target industry median stock return volatility. Stock return 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s 
daily stock return for a given year. 
T_CF_Vol Compustat Target industry median operating cash flow volatility. 
Operating cash flow volatility is calculated as the standard 
deviation of a firm’s quarterly EBITDA/TA over previous 
three years. 
T_Tangibility Compustat Target industry median tangibility (Net PPE/Total Assets) 
T_STK_Vol  For every three-digit SIC industry, the average of firm’s 
stock return volatility using the standard deviation of daily 
stock return for a given year 
T_Sale Growth Compustat Annual percentage change in target industry total sales 
T_Q Compustat Target industry median Tobin’s Q. 
T_ROA Compustat Target industry median return on assets (EBIT/TA) 
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Figure 1: A firm’s decision tree of diversification 
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Figure 2: Sample distribution by announcement year 
The sample consists of 39,876 acquisitions made by 6,571 firms between 1994 and 2013. An acquisition is defined as 
a small acquisition if the transaction value relative to the acquirer’s market value is less than 1% (including 
acquisitions with no transaction value). The upper blank bars represent the number of small acquisitions and the lower 
solid bars represent the number of large acquisitions. In aggregate, there are 22,873 small acquisitions and 17,003 
large acquisitions. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 39,876 acquisitions made by 6,571 firms between 1994 and 2013. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. All dollar values are in millions and are adjusted by the CPI to year 2013 
dollars. Sources and definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix. 
Variable N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
Acquirer characteristics       
Log (Assets) ($ mil.) 39876 6.59 2.27 4.96 6.48 8.05 
Tobin’s Q 39876 2.10 1.24 1.24 1.68 2.46 
Free Cash Flow  39876 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.08 
Leverage 39876 0.23 0.21 0.05 0.20 0.35 
Dividend 39876 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CAPEX 39876 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 
R&D Intensity 39876 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Top 5 Institution 39876 0.53 0.22 0.34 0.45 0.67 
Deal characteristics       
Diversifying 39876 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Small 39876 0.57 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CAR (-1, +1) (%) 38320 0.83 6.71 -2.20 0.22 3.25 
Relative Size  20798 0.19 0.35 0.02 0.06 0.18 
Public Target 39876 0.08 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All Cash Deal 39876 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Tender Deal 39876 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 2:  Diversifying versus non-diversifying acquisitions 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from logit and OLS regressions modeling a firm’s decision to start with 
small acquisitions. The sample consists of 39,876 acquisitions announced between 1994 and 2013. In Model 1, the 
dependent variable is Small, which is equal to one if transaction value is less than 1% of acquirer’s market 
value(including acquisitions with no transaction value) and zero otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent variable is Ln 
(Relative Size), which is the natural logarithm of the ratio of transaction value to the acquirer’s market value. First is 
a dummy variable which is equal to one if the acquisition is the acquiring firm’s first acquisition in the target industry 
and zero otherwise. Diversifying is a dummy variable which is equal to one if target industry has a different three-
digit SIC code from any segment of the acquiring firm and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 
5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 VARIABLES Small Ln (Relative Size) 
First*Diversifying 0.1688** -0.0346 
 (2.45) (-1.37) 
First -0.3589*** 0.1634*** 
 (-10.02) (4.91) 
Diversifying 0.1941*** -0.2476*** 
 (3.03) (-3.50) 
Size  0.2481*** -0.3891*** 
 (19.55) (-22.99) 
Free Cash Flow  -0.2014*** 0.0630 
 (-3.00) (0.93) 
Tobin’s Q  0.0728*** -0.3248*** 
 (4.56) (-18.54) 
Leverage  -0.2364** 0.7992*** 
 (-2.11) (7.94) 
Dividend 0.0974** -0.0021 
 (2.20) (-0.05) 
CAPEX -2.4646*** 0.5210** 
 (-6.91) (2.03) 
R&D Intensity -3.1970*** -0.6641*** 
 (-9.83) (-2.71) 
Top 5 Institution 0.0006 -0.0002* 
 (1.46) (-1.67) 
Constant -1.1196*** -0.1431 
 (-10.83) (-1.22) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 39,876 20,798 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0686  
Adjusted R-squared  0.2581 
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Table 3:  Determinants of learning-univariate analysis 
This table reports the univariate analysis of the determinants of a firm’s decision to start with small acquisitions when 
it diversifies. The sample consists of a firm’s first acquisition in each diversifying industry for 7,517 firm-target 
industry pair. A first acquisition is defined as using the Learning approach if the transaction value is less than 1% of 
acquiring firm’s market value (including acquisitions with no transaction value). Unrelated is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to one if none of the vertical relatedness coefficients is above 1% and zero otherwise. Complementarity 
is the lowest value of complementarity between the diversifying industry and each segment of the acquiring firm 
calculated in Fan and Lang (2000). Dif_SIC_1 is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the diversifying industry 
has a different one-digit SIC from any segment of the acquiring firm. T_STK_Vol is the target industry median stock 
return volatility. Stock return volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock return for a given 
year. T_CF_Vol is the target industry median operating cash flow volatility. T_Tangibility is the target industry median 
tangibility (Net PPE/Total Assets). A_HHI is the sum of squared market shares of all firms in acquirer’s primary three-
digit industry. Rival_M&A is the total transaction value of acquisitions made by the acquiring firm’s rivals in the same 
target industry within two years preceding the acquiring firm’s first acquisition, scaled by the book value of the assets 
in the target industry. Differences in means are tested with a t-test and differences in medians are tested by a Wilcoxon 
two sample test. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Variable Learning (N=4180) Non-learning (N=3337) Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Unrelated 0.5809 1.0000 0.5544 1.0000        0.0265**    0.0000** 
Complementarity  0.4791 0.4761 0.4953 0.4935       -0.0162**   -0.0174** 
Dif_SIC_1 0.6000 1.0000 0.5619 1.0000        0.0381***    0.0000*** 
T_STK_Vol  0.0371 0.0363 0.0369 0.0366        0.0002   -0.0003 
T_CF_Vol  0.0349 0.0337 0.0343 0.0346        0.0006*   -0.0009 
T_Tangibility  0.2129 0.1486 0.2147 0.1531       -0.0018   -0.0045 
A_HHI 0.1569 0.1230 0.1459 0.1107        0.0110**    0.0123*** 
Rival_M&A  0.0079 0.0000 0.0126 0.0000       -0.0047***   -0.0000*** 
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Table 4:  Determinants of learning-multivariate analysis 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from logit regressions modeling a firm’s decision to start with small acquisitions when it diversifies. The sample 
consists of a firm’s first acquisition in each diversifying industry for 7,517 firm-target industry pair. The dependent variable is Small, which is equal to one if 
transaction value is less than 1% of acquirer’s market value(including acquisitions with no transaction value) and zero otherwise. Unrelated is equal to one if none 
of the vertical relatedness coefficients is above 1% and zero otherwise. Complementarity is the lowest value of complementarity between the diversifying industry 
and each segment of the acquiring firm calculated in Fan and Lang (2000). Dif_SIC_1 is equal to one if the diversifying industry has a different one-digit SIC from 
any segment of the acquiring firm. T_STK_Vol is the target industry median stock return volatility. T_CF_Vol is the target industry median operating cash flow 
volatility. T_Tangibility is the target industry median tangibility (Net PPE/Total Assets). A_HHI is the sum of squared market shares of all firms in acquirer’s 
primary three-digit industry. Rival_M&A is the total transaction value of acquisitions made by the acquiring firm’s rivals in the same target industry within two 
years preceding the acquiring firm’s first acquisition, scaled by the book value of the assets in the target industry. Other variables are defined in Appendix. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated 0.0970*        0.1086** 
 (1.92)        (2.13) 
Complementarity   -0.2132**        
  (-1.97)        
Dif_SIC_1   0.1776***      0.1865*** 
   (3.45)      (3.59) 
T_STK_Vol     5.4369**     5.5006** 
    (2.36)     (2.32) 
T_CF_Vol      6.3911***     
     (2.60)     
T_Tangibility       -0.3443**   -0.2728* 
      (-2.20)   (-1.69) 
A_HHI       0.4300*  0.3780* 
       (1.95)  (1.72) 
Rival_M&A         -0.6881* -0.6287* 
        (-1.76) (-1.95) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Size  0.2574*** 0.2820*** 0.2576*** 0.2599*** 0.2623*** 0.2576*** 0.2796*** 0.2789*** 0.2603*** 
 (17.59) (16.47) (17.61) (17.64) (17.77) (17.60) (17.80) (17.77) (17.60) 
Free Cash Flow  -0.1935** -0.1119 -0.1824** -0.1905** -0.2005** -0.1878** -0.2157** -0.2187** -0.1892** 
 (-2.14) (-0.91) (-2.04) (-2.08) (-2.19) (-2.06) (-2.37) (-2.37) (-2.11) 
Tobin’s Q  0.1152*** 0.1121*** 0.1107*** 0.1138*** 0.1142*** 0.1130*** 0.1081*** 0.1061*** 0.1122*** 
 (5.13) (4.24) (4.93) (5.06) (5.08) (5.03) (4.77) (4.68) (4.97) 
Leverage  0.2192 0.1779 0.2133 0.2150 0.2124 0.2374 0.1014 0.1077 0.2294 
 (1.46) (1.01) (1.42) (1.43) (1.41) (1.57) (0.67) (0.71) (1.51) 
Dividend 0.1009 0.0485 0.1052* 0.0985 0.1002 0.1051* 0.0640 0.0729 0.1013 
 (1.62) (0.67) (1.69) (1.58) (1.61) (1.69) (1.02) (1.16) (1.62) 
CAPEX 0.4004 0.5278 0.4132 0.3675 0.3953 0.5157 0.1614 0.1434 0.5071 
 (0.81) (0.93) (0.84) (0.74) (0.80) (1.04) (0.33) (0.29) (1.02) 
R&D Intensity -1.9250*** -1.7109*** -1.9221*** -2.0332*** -2.0067*** -1.9509*** -1.7946*** -1.9563*** -1.9010*** 
 (-3.86) (-2.81) (-3.87) (-4.04) (-3.99) (-3.91) (-3.58) (-3.93) (-3.74) 
Top 5 Institution 0.0171* 0.0460** 0.0170* 0.0170* 0.0174* 0.0173* 0.0175* 0.0180* 0.0155 
 (1.73) (2.09) (1.68) (1.70) (1.72) (1.72) (1.85) (1.92) (1.55) 
T_Q -0.1259** -0.0545 -0.1199** -0.1379** -0.1645*** -0.1524** -0.0857 -0.0890 -0.1680*** 
 (-2.14) (-0.80) (-2.07) (-2.27) (-2.76) (-2.54) (-1.49) (-1.55) (-2.69) 
T_ROA -0.1934 -0.4664 -0.0885 0.1443 0.2317 -0.1787 -0.2906 -0.3162 0.2496 
 (-0.58) (-1.18) (-0.26) (0.37) (0.60) (-0.53) (-0.83) (-0.91) (0.62) 
T_Sale Growth 0.3495 0.5695** 0.2801 0.2865 0.2658 0.3302 0.0809 0.0904 0.2586 
 (1.05) (2.10) (0.97) (0.95) (0.93) (1.02) (0.45) (0.49) (0.90) 
Constant -1.5433*** -1.6518*** -1.5868*** -1.6714*** -1.6645*** -1.3804*** -1.6297*** -1.5459*** -1.8005*** 
 (-10.97) (-9.54) (-11.25) (-9.93) (-10.90) (-9.30) (-9.64) (-9.38) (-9.27) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,517 5,132 7,517 7,503 7,497 7,512 7,517 7,510 7,493 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0609 0.0688 0.0617 0.0609 0.0610 0.0609 0.0660 0.0660 0.0639 
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Table 5:  Determinants of learning – Robustness tests 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from OLS regressions modeling a firm’s decision to start with small acquisitions in diversification. The sample consists 
of a firm’s first acquisition in each diversifying industry for 7,517 firm-target industry pair. The dependent variable is Ln (Relative Size), which is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of transaction value to acquirer’s market value. Unrelated is equal to one if none of the vertical relatedness coefficients is above 1% and zero 
otherwise. Complementarity is the lowest value of complementarity between the diversifying industry and each segment of the acquiring firm calculated in Fan 
and Lang (2000). Dif_SIC_1 is equal to one if the diversifying industry has a different one-digit SIC from any segment of the acquiring firm. T_STK_Vol is the 
target industry median stock return volatility. T_CF_Vol is the target industry median operating cash flow volatility. T_Tangibility is the target industry median 
tangibility (Net PPE/Total Assets). A_HHI is the sum of squared market shares of all firms in acquirer’s primary three-digit industry. Rival_M&A is the total 
transaction value of acquisitions made by the acquiring firm’s rivals in the same target industry within two years preceding the acquiring firm’s first acquisition, 
scaled by the book value of the assets in the target industry. Other variables are defined in Appendix. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity 
robust standard error (clustered by firm). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  Ln (Relative Size) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated -0.0943*        -0.1083** 
 (-1.91)        (-2.20) 
Complementarity   0.1890*        
  (1.77)        
Dif_SIC_1   -0.2329***      -0.2318*** 
   (-4.55)      (-4.53) 
T_STK_Vol     -6.3267***     -5.8501** 
    (-2.90)     (-2.58) 
T_CF_Vol      -5.6300**     
     (-2.25)     
T_Tangibility       0.3637**   0.2594 
      (2.36)   (1.64) 
A_HHI       -0.0082  -0.0181 
       (-0.03)  (-0.08) 
Rival_M&A         0.3361*** 0.3786*** 
        (2.96) (3.50) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Size  -0.4030*** -0.3921*** -0.4044*** -0.4055*** -0.4077*** -0.4039*** -0.4136*** -0.4142*** -0.4062*** 
 (-21.80) (-20.13) (-21.81) (-21.98) (-21.73) (-21.83) (-21.14) (-21.26) (-21.95) 
Free Cash Flow  -0.1341 -0.0964 -0.1550 -0.1410 -0.1359 -0.1452 -0.1189 -0.1147 -0.1540 
 (-1.22) (-0.81) (-1.43) (-1.30) (-1.25) (-1.32) (-1.11) (-1.07) (-1.42) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.3118*** -0.2983*** -0.3051*** -0.3092*** -0.3095*** -0.3111*** -0.3133*** -0.3138*** -0.3027*** 
 (-15.33) (-12.65) (-14.99) (-15.19) (-15.14) (-15.22) (-14.94) (-15.08) (-14.76) 
Leverage  0.5161*** 0.6056*** 0.5379*** 0.5211*** 0.5262*** 0.4986*** 0.5328*** 0.5325*** 0.5007*** 
 (3.50) (3.50) (3.64) (3.53) (3.56) (3.35) (3.58) (3.57) (3.38) 
Dividend -0.0788 -0.0747 -0.0794 -0.0792 -0.0775 -0.0852 -0.0742 -0.0760 -0.0861 
 (-1.37) (-1.08) (-1.38) (-1.38) (-1.35) (-1.48) (-1.29) (-1.32) (-1.50) 
CAPEX -1.5984*** -1.8021*** -1.5853*** -1.5477*** -1.5638*** -1.7160*** -1.5185*** -1.5308*** -1.6428*** 
 (-3.28) (-3.01) (-3.29) (-3.18) (-3.19) (-3.51) (-3.11) (-3.12) (-3.39) 
R&D Intensity -1.6102*** -1.6831*** -1.6236*** -1.4547*** -1.5560*** -1.5600*** -1.6585*** -1.6612*** -1.4692*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.37) (-4.00) (-3.56) (-3.82) (-3.85) (-4.00) (-4.09) (-3.52) 
Top 5 Institution 0.0022 0.0983** 0.0028 0.0033 0.0020 0.0020 0.0008 0.0008 0.0050 
 (0.12) (2.55) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.28) 
T_Q -0.0367 -0.0751 -0.0382 -0.0207 -0.0015 -0.0073 -0.0633 -0.0614 0.0106 
 (-0.67) (-1.11) (-0.70) (-0.38) (-0.03) (-0.13) (-1.11) (-1.08) (0.19) 
T_ROA 0.4871 0.4317 0.3535 0.1334 0.1187 0.4774 0.4117 0.4445 0.0161 
 (1.54) (1.16) (1.11) (0.35) (0.31) (1.50) (1.19) (1.29) (0.04) 
T_Sale Growth -0.1542 -0.4674* -0.1028 -0.1226 -0.1240 -0.1368 -0.2166* -0.2210* -0.0802 
 (-1.40) (-1.74) (-1.05) (-1.20) (-1.23) (-1.28) (-1.90) (-1.92) (-0.83) 
Constant 0.3102** 0.0962 0.3772** 0.4638*** 0.4116** 0.1464 0.1797 0.1795 0.5308*** 
 (2.12) (0.55) (2.54) (2.66) (2.46) (0.95) (1.00) (1.06) (2.61) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,007 2,740 4,007 4,002 3,995 4,006 4,007 4,005 3,999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.275 0.274 0.278 0.276 0.275 0.275 0.278 0.279 0.281 
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Table 6:  Propensity of subsequent acquisitions – Logit model 
This table reports the estimated odds ratios from logit regressions modeling a learning firm’s propensity to 
make subsequent acquisitions in the same diversifying industry within a five-year window following its first 
acquisition. In Model 1, the dependent variable is Subsequent, which is equal to one if a learning firm makes 
any subsequent acquisition in the same diversifying industry and zero otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent 
variable is Large_Subsequent, which is equal to one if a learning firm makes any subsequent acquisition with 
relative size no less than 1% in the same diversifying industry and zero otherwise. In Model 3, the dependent 
variable is New_Segment, which is equal to one if a learning firm adds a new segment in the same diversifying 
industry and zero otherwise. Success is a dummy variable which is equal to one if CAR (-1, +1) of the first 
acquisition is positive and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix. In parentheses are t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
Success  1.2744** 1.4371* 1.2853* 
 (2.26) (1.88) (1.67) 
Size  1.0733** 0.9233 0.8024*** 
 (2.25) (-1.63) (-5.34) 
Free Cash Flow  3.2503*** 2.1358 0.8151 
 (2.74) (1.55) (-0.53) 
Tobin’s Q  1.1223*** 1.1099** 1.0461 
 (3.51) (2.01) (0.92) 
Leverage  0.8519 0.5939 2.5457** 
 (-0.52) (-0.93) (2.39) 
Dividend 0.8918 0.6225** 1.3047* 
 (-1.01) (-2.19) (1.65) 
CAPEX 0.0332*** 2.0643 16.1844** 
 (-2.63) (0.38) (2.24) 
R&D Intensity 0.0179*** 0.3563 0.2032 
 (-2.88) (-0.58) (-1.09) 
Top 5 Institution 0.9707 0.9831 0.9865 
 (-1.00) (-0.71) (-1.02) 
T_Q 0.6122 0.5376 0.1888*** 
 (-1.10) (-0.83) (-2.59) 
T_ROA 1.3050*** 1.5540*** 1.1922 
 (3.26) (3.79) (1.56) 
T_Sale Growth 1.8736*** 1.6358 2.0836*** 
 (3.04) (1.54) (2.86) 
Constant 0.0380*** 0.0171*** 0.0638*** 
 (-10.90) (-9.26) (-7.07) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,503 3,503 3,503 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0325 0.0491 0.0532 
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Table 7:  Propensity of subsequent acquisitions – Hazard model 
This table reports the estimated hazard ratios from Cox hazard regressions modeling a learning firm’s 
propensity to make subsequent acquisitions in the same diversifying industry following its first acquisition. 
In Model 1, the dependent variable is Subsequent, which is equal to one if a learning firm makes any 
subsequent acquisition in the same diversifying industry and zero otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent 
variable is Large_Subsequent, which is equal to one if a learning firm makes any subsequent acquisition with 
relative size no less than 1% in the same diversifying industry and zero otherwise. In Model 3, the dependent 
variable is New_Segment, which is equal to one if a learning firm adds a new segment in the same diversifying 
industry and zero otherwise. Success is a dummy variable which is equal to one if CAR (-1, +1) of the first 
acquisition is positive and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix. In parentheses are t-
statistics. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
Success  1.2750*** 1.4086* 1.1958 
 (2.97) (1.84) (1.45) 
Size  1.0426* 0.8253*** 0.8730*** 
 (1.91) (-3.68) (-3.98) 
Free Cash Flow  3.7712*** 4.3757** 0.4377** 
 (3.27) (2.01) (-2.35) 
Tobin’s Q  1.1566*** 1.0351 0.9213* 
 (5.33) (0.53) (-1.75) 
Leverage  0.9689 0.8640 1.3917 
 (-0.15) (-0.32) (1.19) 
Dividend 0.9177 0.7209 1.1362 
 (-0.96) (-1.61) (0.96) 
CAPEX 0.3771 0.0502 25.0863** 
 (-0.93) (-1.17) (2.56) 
R&D Intensity 0.0412*** 0.7289 0.3205 
 (-2.88) (-0.16) (-0.88) 
Top 5 Institution 1.0591 1.1535 1.1625 
 (0.33) (0.43) (0.70) 
T_Q 0.4361*** 0.3689* 0.2472*** 
 (-3.09) (-1.69) (-4.25) 
T_ROA 0.9999 1.0001 0.9990 
 (-0.03) (0.01) (-0.24) 
T_Sale Growth 1.0505 1.0480 1.0808 
 (1.51) (0.52) (1.31) 
Observations 34,500 34,090 37,455 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0066 0.0194 0.0152 
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Table 8:  Scale of subsequent acquisitions 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from OLS regressions modeling the scale of a learning firm’s 
subsequent acquisitions in the same diversifying industry within a five-year window following its first 
acquisition. In Model 1, the dependent variable is Ln (Tot_Num), which is the natural logarithm of the total 
number of subsequent acquisitions in the same diversifying industry. In Model 2, the dependent variable is 
Ln (Tot_RV), which is the natural logarithm of the sum of the relative size of subsequent acquisitions in the 
same diversifying industry. In Model 3, the dependent variable is Ln (Tot_DV), which is the natural logarithm 
of the sum of the dollar value of subsequent acquisitions in the same diversifying industry. Success is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if CAR (-1, +1) of the first acquisition is positive and zero otherwise. 
Other variables are defined in Appendix. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust 
standard error (clustered by firm). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (Tot_Num) Ln (Tot_RV) Ln (Tot_DV) 
Success  0.0288*** 0.0037** 0.0841** 
 (2.68) (1.99) (2.23) 
Size  0.0076** -0.0016** 0.0410*** 
 (2.51) (-2.50) (3.32) 
Free Cash Flow  0.0613** -0.0004 0.1881* 
 (2.03) (-0.07) (1.75) 
Tobin’s Q  0.0125*** 0.0019* 0.0463*** 
 (2.78) (1.66) (2.61) 
Leverage  -0.0155 0.0078 -0.0912 
 (-0.51) (0.89) (-0.85) 
Dividend -0.0101 0.0006 -0.0769* 
 (-0.90) (0.22) (-1.87) 
CAPEX -0.2160** -0.0136 0.2665 
 (-2.09) (-0.61) (0.70) 
R&D Intensity -0.3451*** -0.0390** 0.1565 
 (-3.44) (-1.97) (0.37) 
Top 5 Institution -0.0006** -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-2.37) (-0.66) (-0.33) 
T_Q -0.0271 -0.0025 -0.3133* 
 (-0.57) (-0.41) (-1.66) 
T_ROA 0.0402*** 0.0016 0.1022*** 
 (3.88) (1.25) (2.82) 
T_Sale Growth 0.0670*** 0.0063* 0.1270* 
 (3.07) (1.86) (1.94) 
Constant -0.0524* 0.0067 -0.4213*** 
 (-1.67) (1.36) (-3.53) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,503 3,242 3,242 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0231 0.00773 0.0234 
54 
 
Table 9:  Learning and performance of large acquisitions 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from OLS and switching regressions modeling the effect of 
learning on the performance of large acquisitions (relative size no less than 1%). The sample first subsequent 
large acquisitions made by a learning firm and the first large acquisitions made by a non-learning firm The 
dependent variable is CAR (-1, +1) is the acquiring firm’s three day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return. 
Learning is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the acquiring firm’s first acquisition in the target 
industry has relative size less than 1% and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Appendix. Model 1 
reports the estimated coefficients from an OLS regression. Model 2 and 3 report the estimated coefficients 
from a switching regression model. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard 
error (clustered by firm). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  CAR (-1, +1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Learning Non-learning 
Learning -0.7020   
 (-1.07)   
Relative Size  1.6216** -0.3871 2.2137*** 
 (2.26) (-0.13) (4.28) 
Size  -0.5611 0.4930 -0.5082*** 
 (-1.33) (1.26) (-5.15) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.2731 -0.7856** -0.2595 
 (-0.74) (-2.00) (-1.58) 
Free Cash Flow  -6.0777 1.8628 0.7238 
 (-1.46) (0.32) (0.41) 
Leverage  -0.0933 2.7216 -0.2875 
 (-0.05) (0.96) (-0.33) 
Run-up  -1.3802*** -0.8948 -0.8475*** 
 (-3.37) (-0.88) (-3.05) 
All-Cash  0.4793 1.7817* 0.6253** 
 (1.02) (1.81) (2.06) 
Public  -2.6626*** -1.3569 -3.4782*** 
 (-3.29) (-0.84) (-5.65) 
Tender 3.3817*** 3.8106* 3.8745*** 
 (2.93) (1.89) (3.93) 
Inverse Mill Ratio  7.4261** -2.5798 
  (2.20) (-1.31) 
Constant 4.4222* -17.8067** 3.6624*** 
 (1.70) (-2.37) (4.65) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,875 306 3,328 
Actual-counterfactual  11.62% 18.82% 
t-statistics  28.66 123.38 
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Table 10:  Robustness: Corporate governance 
This table reports the replications of Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 (in Panel A and B) by 
including various corporate governance measures. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each 
regression is reported. CEO Duality is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board and zero otherwise. Board Size is the number of directors on the board. Board 
Independence is the percentage of the independent directors on the board. GIM index from Gomper, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) and E-index is from Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). All specifications and other variable 
definitions are the same as the respective tables above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered 
by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Model 1 Table 2  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
First*Diversifying 0.1378 0.1700* 0.2168** 
 (1.51) (1.74) (2.23) 
First -0.2282*** -0.2830*** -0.3246*** 
 (-4.03) (-5.27) (-5.89) 
Diversifying 0.1565** 0.2520*** 0.2307*** 
 (2.39) (2.99) (2.76) 
CEO Duality  0.0377   
 (0.98)   
Board Size 0.0233**   
 (2.46)   
Board Independence  -0.0948   
 (-0.84)   
GIM index   -0.0312**  
  (-2.52)  
E-index    -0.0721*** 
   (-3.13) 
Observations 15,812 20,645 20,645 
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Panel B: Replicate Model 9 Table 4  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Unrelated 0.0360 0.1033 0.0960 
 (0.38) (1.34) (1.23) 
Dif_SIC_1 0.3074*** 0.2137*** 0.2528*** 
 (3.38) (2.82) (3.24) 
T_STK_Vol  3.5665 4.6786 2.2407 
 (0.89) (1.37) (0.65) 
T_Tangibility  -0.4268 -0.3065 -0.2671 
 (-1.47) (-1.32) (-1.11) 
A_HHI 0.3297 0.0862 0.0469 
 (0.84) (0.25) (0.13) 
Rival_M&A  -0.4735* -0.5234 -0.5849 
 (-1.83) (-1.36) (-1.39) 
CEO Duality  0.0001   
 (0.00)   
Board Size 0.0121   
 (0.47)   
Board Independence  -0.0572   
 (-0.18)   
GIM index   -0.0220  
  (-1.30)  
E-index    -0.0661** 
   (-2.02) 
Observations 2,643 3,574 3,574 
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Table 11:  Robustness: Target industry characteristics 
This table reports the replications of Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 (in Panel A and B) by 
controlling for target industry characteristics. In Model 3, the sample consists acquisitions with targets in the 
high tech industry according to the classification in Loughran and Ritter (2004). In Model 4, the sample 
consists acquisitions with targets not in the high tech industry. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest 
in each regression is reported. All specifications and other variable definitions are the same as the respective 
tables above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Model 1 Table 2  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
First*Diversifying 0.1667*** 0.1745** 0.2537* 0.1374* 
 (2.81) (2.48) (1.85) (1.77) 
First -0.3081*** -0.3030*** -0.2993*** -0.3540*** 
 (-10.08) (-8.69) (-5.28) (-7.91) 
Diversifying 0.1687*** 0.1189* 0.0740 0.2149*** 
 (3.44) (1.83) (0.61) (2.96) 
Target Industry-Year Dummies Yes No No No 
Target Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38,488 39,228 12,095 27,224 
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Panel B: Replicate Model 9 Table 4  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Unrelated 0.0808 0.1016* 0.1740 0.1195** 
 (1.41) (1.86) (1.02) (2.21) 
Dif_SIC_1 0.1199** 0.1163** 0.4257** 0.1482*** 
 (1.97) (2.01) (2.25) (2.74) 
T_STK_Vol  6.9355 4.1536 15.8980* 7.9764*** 
 (1.52) (1.43) (1.68) (3.22) 
T_Tangibility  -0.7292*** -1.1026* 0.2164 -0.3184* 
 (-2.71) (-1.77) (0.29) (-1.91) 
A_HHI -0.7131* -0.7327** -3.5803 -0.7493* 
 (-1.95) (-2.15) (-1.15) (-1.88) 
Rival_M&A  0.3219 0.3179 -0.8368 0.3642 
 (1.47) (1.62) (-0.76) (1.62) 
Target Industry-Year Dummies Yes No No No 
Target Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,610 7,459 696 6,797 
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Table 12:  Robustness: Exclude non-public targets and acquirers with extreme size 
This table reports the replications of Model 1 of Table 2 and Model 9 of Table 4 (in Panel A and B) by 
excluding private and subsidiary targets and extremely large and small acquirers. In Model 1, the sample 
consists acquisitions with public targets only. In Model 2, the sample excludes acquisitions whose acquirer 
size is in the top and bottom quartiles. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is 
reported. All specifications and other variable definitions are the same as the respective tables above. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Model 1 Table 2  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
First*Diversifying 0.5453* 0.2553*** 
 (1.67) (2.69) 
First -0.0335 -0.4374*** 
 (-0.19) (-8.80) 
Diversifying 0.3071 0.1971** 
 (1.22) (2.28) 
Observations 2,685 19,660 
 
Panel B: Replicate Model 9 Table 4  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
Unrelated 0.2423 0.1766** 
 (0.73) (2.54) 
Dif_SIC_1 0.9569*** 0.1716** 
 (2.98) (2.41) 
T_STK_Vol  18.1310 8.7957*** 
 (1.35) (2.75) 
T_Tangibility  -1.8476 -0.0703 
 (-1.60) (-0.31) 
A_HHI 3.4058** 0.4159 
 (2.31) (1.30) 
Rival_M&A  -1.9240 -0.4601 
 (-0.37) (-0.69) 
Observations 352 3,763 
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Table 13:  Robustness: Sensitivity of the selection model in switching regression 
This table reports the replications of Table 9 by using different variables in the selection model of switching 
regression. The differences in actual CARs and counterfactual CARs for both learning and no-learning firms 
estimated from switching regression are reported (t-statistics are in parentheses). All specifications and other 
variable definitions are the same as the respective tables above. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% percentiles.  
Variable in selection model Actual CAR(-1,+1) - Counterfactual CAR(-1,+1) 
 Learning Non-learning 
Unrelated 11.58% 20.99% 
 (28.88) (135.96) 
Complementarity  11.23% 20.38% 
 (22.15) (103.51) 
Dif_SIC_1 11.57% 21.04% 
 (28.67) (136.24) 
T_STK_Vol  11.47% 19.49% 
 (28.43) (127.57) 
T_CF_Vol  11.39% 16.11% 
 (28.58) (106.17) 
T_Tangibility  11.57% 20.82% 
 (28.86) (135.74) 
A_HHI 11.59% 21.45% 
 (28.87) (139.42) 
Rival_M&A  11.73% 20.22% 
  (29.21) (131.81) 
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Table 14:  Robustness: Measure Acquirer CAR over (-2, +2) window 
This table reports the replications of Table 6 through 9 (in Panel A through D) by constructing acquirer CAR 
based on announcement returns measured over the (-2, +2) day window around the deal announcement. Only 
the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is reported. All specifications and other variable 
definitions are the same as the respective tables above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered 
by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Table 6    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
        
Success  1.2126* 1.2639 1.2605 
 (1.90) (1.27) (1.60) 
Observations 3,503 3,503 3,503 
 
Panel B: Replicate Table 7    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
Success  1.2864* 1.4043 1.1126 
 (1.81) (1.64) (1.38) 
Observations 34,500 34,090 37,455 
 
Panel C: Replicate Table 8    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (Tot_Num) Ln (Tot_RV) Ln (Tot_DV) 
Success  0.0216** 0.0036* 0.0410 
 (2.04) (1.92) (1.07) 
Observations 3,503 3,242 3,242 
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Panel D: Replicate Table 9  
  CAR (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Learning Non-learning 
Learning -0.4123   
 (-0.59)   
Relative Size  1.8187** 1.7588 2.9703*** 
 (1.98) (0.77) (5.19) 
Size  -0.7066 -0.1153 -0.5483*** 
 (-1.60) (-0.24) (-4.82) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.5449 -1.1562** -0.5196*** 
 (-1.33) (-2.24) (-2.70) 
Free Cash Flow  -8.9791** -5.0338 0.8735 
 (-2.05) (-0.70) (0.41) 
Leverage  -0.3293 0.0516 -0.6991 
 (-0.15) (0.02) (-0.65) 
Run-up  -1.8647*** -0.9677 -1.3282*** 
 (-3.60) (-0.74) (-3.97) 
All-Cash  0.4029 2.8232** 0.4908 
 (0.74) (2.18) (1.36) 
Public  -2.9076*** -2.0241 -4.2158*** 
 (-2.98) (-0.99) (-5.95) 
Tender 3.3523** 3.7531* 3.9727*** 
 (2.38) (1.77) (3.28) 
Constant 4.8563* -1.6634 4.4516*** 
 (1.76) (-0.18) (5.04) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,875 306 3,328 
Actual-counterfactual                                 13.82%           5.30% 
t-statistics   33.76 35.77 
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Table 15:  Robustness: Measure Acquirer post-merger operating performance 
This table reports the replications of Table 9 by using the change in post-merger return on sales ∆ROS as 
dependent variable. ∆ROS is calculated as the difference between the acquirer’s post-merge three-year 
average ROS (EBIT/SALES) and ROS before acquisition. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in 
each regression is reported. All specifications and other variable definitions are the same as the respective 
tables above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 ∆ROS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Learning Non-learning 
        
Learning 0.0357   
 (1.01)   
Relative Size  0.0340 -0.0288 0.0133 
 (1.00) (-0.39) (0.45) 
Size  -0.0430 -0.0132 0.0135** 
 (-1.57) (-0.70) (2.45) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.0810*** -0.0297 -0.0040 
 (-3.61) (-1.22) (-0.39) 
Free Cash Flow  -1.4130*** -1.4776** -1.0538*** 
 (-4.84) (-2.20) (-8.03) 
Leverage  -0.1525 -0.4656** 0.0276 
 (-1.60) (-2.47) (0.50) 
Run-up  -0.0316 0.0855 -0.0248 
 (-1.27) (1.36) (-1.44) 
All-Cash  0.0530** 0.1873*** 0.0347** 
 (2.23) (2.86) (2.13) 
Public  0.0320 0.1714 0.0250 
 (1.03) (1.51) (0.93) 
Tender 0.0304 -0.0275 0.0308 
 (0.69) (-0.30) (0.67) 
Constant 0.4560*** 0.2417 -0.0670 
 (2.79) (0.65) (-1.55) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,875 306 3,328 
Actual-counterfactual 0.25 0.14 
t-statistics   11.55 54.28 
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Table 16:  Robustness: Measure subsequent acquisitions within a three-year window  
This table reports the replications of Table 6 and 8 (in Panel A and B) by using a three-year window after 
acquirer’s first acquisition. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is reported. All 
specifications and other variable definitions are the same as the respective tables above. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Table 6    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent Large_Subsequent New_Segment 
     
Success  1.4168*** 1.4420* 1.1485 
 (3.01) (1.74) (0.84) 
Observations 3,809 3,809 3,809 
 
Panel B: Replicate Table 8    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (Tot_Num) Ln (Tot_RV) Ln (Tot_DV) 
     
Success  0.0282*** 0.0020 0.0604** 
 (3.09) (1.33) (1.99) 
Observations 3,809 3,581 3,581 
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Table 17:  Robustness: Alternative definition of small acquisitions 
This table reports the replications of Table 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (in Panel A through G) by defining small 
acquisitions based on the dollar value of the transaction. Small is a dummy variable which is equal to one if 
the acquisition’s transaction value is less than 1 million dollars (including those with no transaction value) 
and zero otherwise. Ln (Dollar Value) is the natural logarithm of the deal transaction value in millions. Only 
the coefficient on the variable of interest in each regression is reported. All specifications and other variable 
definitions are the same as the respective tables above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered 
by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Table 2   
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Small Ln (Dollar Value) 
      
First*Diversifying 0.1490** -0.1229 
 (2.21) (-1.64) 
First -0.3409*** 0.1776*** 
 (-9.30) (5.61) 
Diversifying 0.1823*** -0.1677** 
 (2.88) (-2.36) 
Observations 39,876 20,798 
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Panel B: Replicate of Table 4  
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated 0.0808*        0.0843* 
 (1.65)        (1.72) 
Complementarity   -0.1431        
  (-1.38)        
Dif_SIC_1   0.1234**      0.1305*** 
   (2.48)      (2.60) 
T_STK_Vol     2.9457     2.6140 
    (1.32)     (1.13) 
T_CF_Vol      5.7788**     
     (2.42)     
T_Tangibility       -0.4392***   -0.4145*** 
      (-2.94)   (-2.69) 
A_HHI       0.6038***  0.5671*** 
       (2.82)  (2.66) 
Rival_M&A         -0.5487 -0.4641 
        (-1.35) (-1.40) 
Observations 7,517 5,132 7,517 7,503 7,497 7,512 7,517 7,510 7,493 
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Panel C: Replicate Table 5  
  Ln (Dollar Value) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated -0.0559        -0.0635 
 (-1.15)        (-1.31) 
Complementarity   0.2867***        
  (2.68)        
Dif_SIC_1   -0.1874***      -0.1861*** 
   (-3.71)      (-3.69) 
T_STK_Vol     -4.6920**     -4.7074** 
    (-2.19)     (-2.10) 
T_CF_Vol      -4.1370*     
     (-1.68)     
T_Tangibility       0.2474*   0.1643 
      (1.69)   (1.09) 
A_HHI       -0.1526  -0.1987 
       (-0.64)  (-0.83) 
Rival_M&A         0.5063*** 0.5408*** 
        (4.33) (4.81) 
Observations 4,007 2,740 4,007 4,002 3,995 4,006 4,007 4,005 3,999 
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Panel D: Replicate Table 6    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
        
Success  1.2638** 1.4737** 1.3502* 
 (2.01) (2.11) (1.89) 
Observations 3,038 3,038 3,038 
 
Panel E: Replicate Table 7    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
        
Success  1.3181* 1.2458** 1.2466* 
 (1.92) (2.47) (1.70) 
Observations 32,424 29,649 32,077 
 
Panel F: Replicate Table 8    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (Tot_Num) Ln (Tot_RV) Ln (Tot_DV) 
     
Success  0.0282** 0.0042** 0.0980*** 
 (2.50) (2.08) (2.78) 
Observations 3,038 2,818 2,818 
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Panel G: Replicate Table 9  
  CAR (-1, +1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Learning Non-learning 
    
Learning -0.0615   
 (-0.11)   
Relative Size  1.6247** 1.0281 2.2646*** 
 (2.42) (0.40) (4.35) 
Size  -0.6888** 0.3409 -0.4104*** 
 (-1.98) (0.93) (-5.42) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.3431 -0.6968** -0.2400* 
 (-1.07) (-2.19) (-1.80) 
Free Cash Flow  -2.2539 1.1444 0.4050 
 (-0.59) (0.18) (0.25) 
Leverage  0.6530 2.1010 -0.6099 
 (0.40) (0.91) (-0.75) 
Run-up  -1.4602*** -0.4722 -0.8771*** 
 (-3.85) (-0.46) (-3.37) 
All-Cash  0.2033 2.1139** 0.5105* 
 (0.52) (2.54) (1.84) 
Public  -2.0337*** -0.3809 -2.8807*** 
 (-3.21) (-0.24) (-5.22) 
Tender 2.4323*** 1.5477 3.3563*** 
 (2.67) (0.78) (3.86) 
Constant 5.0016** -14.2442 3.1812*** 
 (2.14) (-1.57) (4.86) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,107 319 3,788 
Actual-counterfactual                            11.38%         14.64% 
t-statistics   36.61 109.83 
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Table 18:  Robustness: Two-digit SIC industry classification 
This table reports the replications of Table 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (in Panel A through G) by defining industry 
based on the two-digit SIC industry classification. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each 
regression is reported. All specifications and other variable definitions are the same as the respective tables 
above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics 
based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Table 2   
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Small Ln (Relative Size) 
      
First*Diversifying 0.1360** -0.0572 
 (1.97) (-1.47) 
First -0.3611*** 0.1824*** 
 (-9.99) (6.43) 
Diversifying 0.2286*** -0.2878*** 
 (3.65) (-6.56) 
Observations 39,876 20,798 
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Panel B: Replicate Table 4 
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated 0.1067*        0.1366** 
 (1.88)        (2.38) 
Complementarity   -0.1549        
  (-1.27)        
Dif_SIC_1   0.2064***      0.2168*** 
   (3.13)      (3.24) 
T_STK_Vol     5.1127*     5.9460* 
    (1.67)     (1.90) 
T_CF_Vol      5.6394**     
     (2.22)     
T_Tangibility       -0.1359   -0.0667 
      (-0.75)   (-0.35) 
A_HHI       0.7169  0.8948* 
       (1.46)  (1.83) 
Rival_M&A         -0.6512 -0.5955 
        (-1.39) (-1.24) 
Observations 5,651 3,916 5,651 5,643 5,075 5,651 5,648 5,650 5,639 
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Panel C: Replicate Table 5 
 Ln (Relative Size) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated -0.0647        -0.0892 
 (-1.15)        (-1.58) 
Complementarity   0.0952        
  (0.82)        
Dif_SIC_1   -0.2247***      -0.2235*** 
   (-3.62)      (-3.55) 
T_STK_Vol     -8.5959***     -8.8004*** 
    (-2.94)     (-2.94) 
T_CF_Vol      -5.9125**     
     (-2.27)     
T_Tangibility       0.2486   0.1090 
      (1.41)   (0.61) 
A_HHI       0.0389  -0.1645 
       (0.08)  (-0.33) 
Rival_M&A         0.1975 0.2570 
        (0.68) (0.89) 
Observations 2,978 2,062 2,978 2,976 2,715 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,976 
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Panel D: Replicate Table 6    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
Success  1.1647 1.1947 1.1606 
 (1.45) (1.00) (0.85) 
Observations 2,819 2,819 2,819 
 
 
Panel E: Replicate Table 7    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
Success  1.1640* 1.0414 1.1200 
 (1.88) (0.29) (0.90) 
Observations 23,248 26,993 26,702 
 
 
Panel F: Replicate Table 8    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (Tot_Num) Ln (Tot_RV) Ln (Tot_DV) 
Success  0.0218* 0.0023 0.0755 
 (1.71) (0.91) (1.61) 
Observations 2,819 2,575 2,575 
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Panel G: Replicate of Table 9  
  CAR (-1, +1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Learning Non-learning 
        
Learning -1.3020   
 (-1.49)   
Relative Size  0.9977 0.5557 2.9649*** 
 (1.22) (0.17) (4.78) 
Size  -0.5932 0.2253 -0.3603*** 
 (-1.11) (0.78) (-3.00) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.6658 -0.5840 -0.0943 
 (-1.38) (-1.11) (-0.54) 
Free Cash Flow  -4.5037 -7.0819 -0.3393 
 (-0.88) (-1.42) (-0.17) 
Leverage  -2.1199 -1.4826 -0.5426 
 (-0.87) (-0.67) (-0.57) 
Run-up  -0.8458 1.3608 -0.9791*** 
 (-1.64) (1.64) (-2.80) 
All-Cash  0.9488 2.1236** 0.4766 
 (1.44) (2.47) (1.24) 
Public  -3.9685*** -0.4855 -2.5488*** 
 (-3.78) (-0.34) (-3.11) 
Tender 5.4839*** 2.3330 5.4121*** 
 (3.05) (1.24) (3.46) 
Constant 4.6286 -9.6084** 4.1213*** 
 (1.41) (-2.11) (4.80) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,533 314 2,219 
Actual-counterfactual                                  5.53%            11.97% 
t-statistics   15.12 64.51 
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Table 19:  Robustness: Four-digit SIC industry classification 
This table reports the replications of Table 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (in Panel A through G) by defining industry 
based on the four-digit SIC industry classification. Only the coefficient on the variable of interest in each 
regression is reported. All specifications and other variable definitions are the same as the respective tables 
above. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics 
based on heteroskedasticity robust standard error (clustered by firm). Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Replicate Table 2   
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Small Ln (Relative Size) 
      
First*Diversifying 0.0662 0.0021 
 (1.11) (0.32) 
First -0.3823*** 0.0223*** 
 (-9.57) (5.33) 
Diversifying 0.3734*** -0.0282*** 
 (6.73) (-5.31) 
Observations 39,876 20,798 
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Panel B: Replicate Table 4 
  Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated 0.1038**        0.0974 
 (2.02)        (1.62) 
Complementarity   -0.3792***        
  (-3.35)        
Dif_SIC_1   0.2330***      0.2766*** 
   (4.51)      (4.57) 
T_STK_Vol     2.9094     1.6568 
    (1.43)     (0.68) 
T_CF_Vol      4.9944**     
     (2.14)     
T_Tangibility       -0.3318**   -0.4150** 
      (-2.06)   (-2.09) 
A_HHI       0.3733*  0.3128 
       (1.87)  (1.58) 
Rival_M&A         -0.4558** -0.1401 
        (-2.18) (-0.64) 
Observations 7,383 5,062 7,383 7,343 7,364 7,378 5,529 7,377 5,494 
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Panel C: Replicate Table 5  
  Ln (Relative Size) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unrelated -0.1040**        -0.0518 
 (-2.16)        (-0.92) 
Complementarity   0.1354        
  (1.33)        
Dif_SIC_1   -0.2556***      -0.2043*** 
   (-5.32)      (-3.66) 
T_STK_Vol     -5.1267***     -4.4109* 
    (-2.62)     (-1.95) 
T_CF_Vol      -5.0469**     
     (-2.25)     
T_Tangibility       0.4875***   0.5219*** 
      (3.01)   (2.77) 
A_HHI       0.1181  0.1711 
       (0.64)  (0.92) 
Rival_M&A         0.3410*** 0.2448** 
        (3.23) (2.10) 
Observations 4,112 2,789 4,112 4,089 4,102 4,111 3,200 4,111 3,185 
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Panel D: Replicate  Table 6    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
        
Success  1.0209 0.9774 1.0341 
 (0.21) (-0.13) (0.18) 
Observations 3,742 3,742 3,742 
 
 
Panel E: Replicate Table 7    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Subsequent  Large_Subsequent  New_Segment  
    
Success  1.0667 0.9389 0.9163 
 (0.85) (-0.34) (-0.66) 
Observations 32,115 37,307 36,290 
 
 
Panel F: Replicate Table 8    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln (Tot_Num) Ln (Tot_RV) Ln (Tot_DV) 
        
Success  0.0048 0.0022 0.0056 
 (0.45) (1.35) (0.15) 
Observations 3,742 3,480 3,480 
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Panel G: Replicate Table 9  
  CAR (-1, +1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Learning Non-learning 
        
Learning -0.4413   
 (-0.88)   
Relative Size  1.9692*** 0.0371 2.6395*** 
 (2.99) (0.01) (4.25) 
Size  -0.5196* 0.2189 -0.2433** 
 (-1.65) (0.29) (-2.20) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.4491* -0.8311* -0.1071 
 (-1.65) (-1.81) (-0.66) 
Free Cash Flow  -0.1425 12.0874* -0.6361 
 (-0.04) (1.85) (-0.36) 
Leverage  -1.9713 4.6519 0.5607 
 (-1.20) (1.57) (0.58) 
Run-up  -0.9670*** -0.7899 -1.1561*** 
 (-2.90) (-0.59) (-3.70) 
All-Cash  0.0095 0.8179 0.3440 
 (0.03) (0.89) (0.97) 
Public  -3.0919*** -1.3240 -3.0197*** 
 (-4.92) (-0.90) (-4.61) 
Tender 2.6105*** 1.1104 2.1172** 
 (3.32) (0.61) (2.16) 
Constant 5.7407*** -14.5065 3.2483*** 
 (2.95) (-1.03) (4.12) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,721 219 2,502 
Actual-counterfactual                                         5.59%            17.13% 
t-statistics   37.43 96.42 
 
 
